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Thinking about thoughts, desires and feelings allows individuals to understand 
themselves (metacognition) and others (mindreading). The present dissertation investigates 
the ability to read other people’s minds from the stance of a third-person observer of 
naturalistic social interaction. Furthermore, it examines mental state communication 
(mindspeaking), introduced as a concept reflecting communicative manifestations of first-
person metacognition and second-person mindreading, i.e., individuals actively listening and 
talking to each other about their mental states. The general aim of this work is to advance an 
integrative research perspective on social-cognitive abilities and their role in interpersonal 
functioning, particularly social fear, avoidance, distress and conflict, across adults with 
(different) psychiatric disorders and typically developing adults.  
Study 1 (Wacker, Bölte, & Dziobek, 2017) considered social psychological, 
biological, and developmental perspectives to characterize gender- and age-related 
individual differences in mindreading performance using the ecologically valid Movie for 
the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) in a large sample. By 
demonstrating that women performed better (specifically in reading the mind of females), 
and that age had a non-linear negative effect on mindreading across the life span, the results 
of this study contribute to a better understanding of interindividual variation in typically 
developing adults.  
Study 2 (Buhlmann, Wacker, & Dziobek, 2015) investigated mindreading deficits 
with the same measure in adults with pathological social evaluation fear (social anxiety and 
body dysmorphic disorder) based on a transdiagnostic approach. Both groups showed a 
lower performance in understanding other people’s mental states in social situations as 
compared to a clinical and a typically developing control group. The results confirm 
cognitive-behavioral models of social anxiety and body dysmorphic disorder emphasizing 
that biased interpretation of social information is a maintaining factor. Moreover, they show 
that mindreading difficulties generalize to situations in which individuals take a third-person 
observer perspective.  
Study 3 (Wacker & Dziobek, 2018) evaluated the effects of a 3-day training in 
Nonviolent Communication (NVC; Rosenberg, 2015) on mental state communication skills, 
perspective taking, empathic concern, empathic distress and social stressors at work in 
typically developing adults in health professions. A pre-post design including a newly 
Summary 
X 
developed NVC questionnaire and an established coding system for the observation of 
communication behavior was realized in the field setting of a public health organization. The 
training reduced empathic distress and prevented social stressors and conflict with 
colleagues and supervisors via increased verbalization of negative emotions in naturalistic 
social situations. This intervention study demonstrates that mental state communication can 
be effectively promoted in typically developing adults in professional roles demanding good 
socioemotional skills.  
The insights gained through the empirical studies emphasize that being able to 
understand other people’s minds and (verbally) reflect upon thoughts, desires, and feelings 
is not only an issue for adults with social-cognitive difficulties, but also substantially relevant 
for typically developing adults, given that it plays a pivotal role in interpersonal functioning 
in particular professions such as healthcare. The dissertation closes with suggestions for 
interventions and future research with regard to social-cognitive bias modification in socially 
anxious individuals, conflict communication in heterosexual romantic couples, and empathic 







Das Nachdenken über Gedanken, Wünsche und Gefühle ermöglicht Individuen, sich 
selbst (Metakognition) und andere (Mindreading) zu verstehen. Die vorliegende Dissertation 
untersucht die Fähigkeit, die mentalen Zustände anderer Personen in naturalistischer sozialer 
Interaktion aus der Dritte-Person-Perspektive eines Beobachters zu verstehen. Des Weiteren 
behandelt sie die Kommunikation mentaler Zustände (Mindspeaking). Dieses Konzept 
reflektiert die kommunikativen Manifestationen von Metakognition aus der Erste-Person-
Pespektive und Mindreading aus der Zweiten-Person-Perspektive, d.h. Individuen, die über 
ihre mentalen Zustände sprechen und einander aktiv zuhören. Das allgemeine Ziel dieser 
Arbeit ist die Förderung einer integrativen Forschungsperspektive auf sozial-kognitive 
Fähigkeiten und ihre Rolle für interpersonale Erlebens- und Verhaltensweisen, insbesondere 
soziale Ängstlichkeit, Vermeidung, Distress und Konflikt, in Erwachsenen mit 
(verschiedenen) psychiatrischen Störungen und typisch entwickelten Erwachsenen. 
Studie 1 (Wacker, Bölte, & Dziobek, 2017) berücksichtigt sozial-psychologische, 
biologische und entwicklungspsychologische Perspektiven, um geschlechts- und 
altersbezogene individuelle Unterschiede in Mindreadingperformanz zu charakterisieren auf 
Basis des ökologischen validen “Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition” (Dziobek 
et al., 2006) in einer großen Stichprobe. Indem demonstriert werden konnte, dass Frauen 
eine bessere Performanz zeigten (insbesondere für das Verstehen mentaler Zustände von 
Frauen), und dass Alter einen nicht-linearen negativen Effekt auf Mindreading über die 
Lebensspanne hat, tragen die Ergebnisse dieser Studie dazu bei, interindividuelle Variation 
in typisch entwickelten Erwachsenen besser zu verstehen. 
Studie 2 (Buhlmann, Wacker, & Dziobek, 2015) untersucht Mindreadingdefizite mit 
dem selben Maß in Erwachsenen mit pathologischer Angst vor sozialer Evaluation (soziale 
Angststörung und körperdysmorphe Störung) basierend auf einer transdiagnostischen 
Perspektive. Beide Gruppen zeigten, im Vergleich zu einer klinischen und einer typisch 
entwickelten erwachsenen Kontrollstichprobe, eine niedrigere Performanz in der Fähigkeit, 
die mentalen Zustände anderer Personen in sozialen Situationen zu verstehen. Die 
Ergebnisse bestätigen kognitiv-behaviorale Modelle sozialer Angst- und körperdysmorpher 
Störung, die betonen, dass verzerrte Interpretation von sozialen Informationen ein 
aufrechterhaltender Faktor ist. Zudem zeigen sie, dass Mindreadingprobleme generalisierbar 
Zusammenfassung 
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sind hinsichtlich Situationen, in denen Individuen die Dritte-Person-Perspektive eines 
Beobachters einnehmen. 
Studie 3 (Wacker & Dziobek, 2018) evaluiert die Effekte eines dreitätigen Trainings 
in Gewaltfreier Kommunikation (NVC; Rosenberg, 2015) auf die Kommunikation mentaler 
Zustände, Perspektivübernahme, Mitgefühl, empathischen Distress und soziale Stressoren 
am Arbeitsplatz in typisch entwickelten Erwachsenen in Gesundheitsberufen. Ein Prä-Post-
Design einschließlich eines neu entwickelten NVC-Fragebogens und eines etablierten 
Kodiersystems zur Beobachtung von Kommunikationsverhalten wurde im Feld einer 
Organisation des Gesundheitswesens realisiert. Das Training reduzierte empathischen 
Distress und hatte einen präventiven Effekt auf soziale Stressoren und Konflikte mit 
Kollegen und Vorgesetzten durch gesteigerte Verbalisierung negativer Emotionen in 
naturalistischen sozialen Situationen. Diese Interventionsstudie demonstriert, dass die 
Kommunikation mentaler Zustände effektiv gefördert werden kann in typisch entwickelten 
Erwachsenen in professionellen Rollen, die gute sozioemotionale Fähigkeiten erfordern.  
Die Erkenntnisse der empirischen Studien betonen, dass die Fähigkeit, die mentalen 
Zustände anderer Personen zu verstehen und (verbal) über Gedanken, Wünsche und Gefühle 
zu reflektieren, nicht nur ein Problem für Erwachsene mit sozial-kognitiven Schwierigkeiten 
ist, sondern auch von wesentlicher Relevanz für typisch entwickelte Erwachsene, da es eine 
zentrale Rolle für sozioemotionale Fähigkeiten in bestimmten Berufen wie etwa im 
Gesundheitswesen spielt. Die Dissertation schließt mit Anregungen für Interventionen und 
zukünftige Forschung bezüglich der Modifikation sozial-kognitiver Verzerrungen bei sozial 
ängstlichen Individuen, Konfliktkommunikation in heterosexuellen romantischen 
Beziehungen, und Prävention von Erschöpfung durch empathischen Distress bei Personen 
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1.1 SOCIAL-COGNITIVE ABILITIES 
I closed my mouth and spoke to you in a hundred silent ways. 
- Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī (Persian poet and mystic, 1207-1273) 
A human being is a spatially and temporally limited piece of the whole, what we call “Universe”.                  
He experiences himself and his feelings as separate from the rest, an optical illusion of his consciousness. 
- Albert Einstein (German physicist and mystic, 1879-1955) 
 
The myriad ways in which human beings can connect with each other might yet lie 
beyond the scope of what current scientific inquiry is capable of grasping. However, within 
the scope of the historically still relatively young field of empirical psychology (Titchener, 
1921), we are able to examine certain mental phenomena relevant to individual minds 
“meeting” each other. In particular, research in social cognition aims at understanding the 
nature of cognitive processes and representations related to others and the self in social 
contexts, or, simply put, “how people make sense of other people and themselves in order to 
coordinate with their social world” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013, p. 16). One straightforward yet 
sophisticated way to understand others and the self as social agents is to think about thoughts, 
desires and feelings, i.e., representing others’ and meta-representing one’s own cognitive, 
affective, and motivational states. Understanding the mental states of another person is 
referred to as mindreading (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Whiten, 1991), whereas reflecting on one’s 
own mental states is conceptualized as metacognition (Carruthers, 2009; Frith & Frith, 
2012). The remarkable human capacity for complex symbolic representations through 
language and communication allows people to intertwine both in a dynamic process, as 
conversation partners can explicitly and mutually talk about their own and listen to each 
other’s inner world.  
In the following sections, I will first separately review the multifaceted literature on 
mindreading and metacognition with a specific focus on conceptual aspects relevant to the 
scope of this dissertation. Then, I will introduce the notion of mental state communication 
(mindspeaking) as an emerging concept embedding mindreading and metacognition in the 
context of verbal interaction, an area currently receiving relatively little attention by social 
cognition research. This effort is guided by the present dissertation’s integrative perspective, 
which suggests that the understanding of social-cognitive abilities and their role in 
interpersonal functioning - especially with regard to their applications in personal and 
professional life - will benefit from taking a broader vantage point overlooking the research 




1.1.1 MINDREADING  
1.1.1.1 DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES  
Mindreading has been studied in diverse disciplines and by so many authors that 
alternative terms for the general ability to understand others´ mental states have been 
introduced throughout the past decades. It has been prominently referred to as theory of mind 
(e.g., Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017), mentalizing (e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003), cognitive empathy 
(e.g., Dziobek et al., 2008), empathic accuracy (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990), 
and mental state inference (e.g., Ames, 2004). Like mindreading, these terms serve as 
umbrella concepts within which researchers group more specific abilities, for instance, 
perspective taking (Davis, 1983), and reading others´ cognitive (e.g., false belief 
understanding; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and affective mental states (e.g., emotion 
recognition; Goldman & Sripada, 2005). I will generally use the umbrella term mindreading 
in this dissertation, although the alternative terms will appear on occasion for the purpose of 
linguistic variation. When applicable, I will use more narrow terms for specific mindreading 
abilities. 
After Premack and Woodruff (1978) first asked whether chimpanzees are capable of 
theory of mind, it was traditionally researched in comparative and developmental 
psychology in order to understand which species have the capacity, and the age at which it 
develops in human infants (Lieberman, 2013). With respect to adults, an initial study on the 
development of mindreading in typical ageing indicated increasing “social wisdom” (Happé, 
Winner, & Brownell, 1998), but later research evidenced a negative age effect (Henry, 
Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). In the meantime, personality and social psychology 
became increasingly interested in the accuracy of mindreading as a perceiver-target 
interaction phenomenon (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011), and in the question of gender-related 
differences (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000), whereas sex-related mindreading differences 
were proposed by biological accounts (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Moreover, social psychological 
research also investigated how the tendency to take the perspective of another person’s mind 
positively affects social behavior and relationships (e.g., Clary & Orenstein, 1991; Franzoi, 
Davis, & Young, 1985).  
Another fairly large portion of mindreading literature addresses its psychopathology, 
with a specific focus on autism as a prototypical mindreading disorder (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
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Yet social-cognitive deficits and biases were also found in various other psychiatric 
conditions, e.g., borderline personality disorder (Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren, & 
Roepke, 2010) and schizophrenia (Penn, Sanna, & Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, a negative 
bias in the interpretation of social information has been linked to the maintenance of social 
anxiety disorder (e.g., Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998). Social-cognitive mechanisms in the 
context of pathological fear of social evaluation will be introduced in more detail in section 
1.2.1.  
Mindreading and closely related social-cognitive concepts were studied in applied 
psychological disciplines as well. For instance, understanding a patient’s subjective 
experience was recognized as an important factor of the therapeutic relationship in 
psychotherapy and medical care (Rogers, 1957; Larson & Yao, 2005). Beyond clinical 
practice, organizational and occupational psychology explored social cognition in 
professional interaction, e.g., the multifaceted concept of emotional intelligence 
(encompassing emotion recognition) in leadership and management (Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2000). Finally, mindreading in the workplace, termed social astuteness as a facet of 
political skill, is considered highly relevant for socially effective behavior in organizations 
viewed as micro-political arenas (Ferris, Perrewé, & Douglas, 2002).  
Taken together, the interest in mindreading across psychological disciplines is 
omnipresent but, naturally, highly specific to their respective scopes. This dissertation’s 
integrative approach, however, is inspired by the diversity of research perspectives in these 
areas. Firstly, study 1 combines social psychological, biological, and developmental 
perspectives on neurotypical mindreading differences related to gender and age. Literature 
on differences and biases was largely dominated by a psychopathological perspective, while 
variation in typically developing adults is relatively less researched and understood (Turner 
& Felisberti, 2017). This might be due to the scarcity of mindreading paradigms assessing 
neurotypical performance differences in a sensitive, reliable and ecologically valid way. 
Thus, in study 1, my co-authors and I address open research questions concerning gender 






1.1.1.2 IMAGINING, OBSERVING OR INTERACTING WITH THE OTHER? 
It is truly intriguing that mentalizing about others´ inner worlds can be such an easily 
excitable function in typically developing individuals (or even a default mode of cognition; 
Lieberman, 2013; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008) that it does 
not even require the existence of another person. The target of mindreading can be either 
purely imagined, merely observed, or actually interacted with. This fact gave rise to a 
pluralistic landscape of measures mirroring different modes of mindreading.  
For instance, others´ mental states can be vividly pictured through pure fiction (e.g., 
in literature and arts; Kidd & Castano, 2013), or attributed to physical objects such as moving 
geometric figures (e.g., “troublesome” triangles; Heider & Simmel, 1944) and pictures of 
car shapes (e.g., the “happy car face”; Windhager et al., 2012). However, if the other mind 
is that of an existing individual, she still does not have to be involved in an interaction with 
the mentalizing person. A person’s mind can be read through mere observation from a third-
person perspective (representing natural situations, e.g., bystander role in social interaction). 
This perspective is reflected in numerous behavioral measures including naturalistic video 
or photo stimuli (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Dziobek et al., 
2006, 2008). Finally, inferring the mind of the other from a second-person perspective, for 
instance in a dialogue, is a further highly naturalistic setting for social cognition in action. 
However, taking accurate and objective measures within this dynamic setting can be 
methodologically challenging because it is by definition less structured and controlled, and 
may be more vulnerable to confounds. Thus, apart from supposed theoretical biases against 
the second-person perspective in current social cognition literature (i.e., spectatorial, 
intellectualist accounts seeing mindreaders as detached observers; Schilbach et al., 2013), 
the mentioned methodological difficulties might as well explain why mindreading in real 
interaction continues to be under-researched (but see wide application of the unstructured 
dyadic interaction paradigm of empathic accuracy; Mast & Ickes, 2006). 
Within the studies of this dissertation, an established behavioral measure capturing 
the third-person perspective, the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; 
Dziobek et al., 2006), is applied in study 1 and 2, and a self-report measure assessing second-
person mindreading in verbal interaction (i.e. empathic listening subscale) is developed and 




The ability to meta-represent one’s own mental states and report them claims a 
historical role in psychological research. Since 1879, trained and systematic introspection 
(“Selbstbeobachtung”) was one of the standard methods used in the world’s first 
psychological laboratory established by Wilhelm Wundt, considered the founding father of 
modern psychology (Titchener, 1921). Despite behaviorists´ later attempt to completely ban 
introspection from the discipline’s toolkit (Watson, 1913), it remains a building block for all 
kinds of psychological self-report measures. Current experimental evidence supports the 
assumption that introspective reports are actually accurate and reliable (Questienne, van 
Dijck, & Gevers, 2017). This might partially explain why metacognition went above and 
beyond its role as a classical research method to being studied as a research object itself.  
One central question regarding metacognition is the ways in which individuals reflect on 
their mental states. 
For instance, the tendency to attend to one’s own feelings and thoughts (private self-
consciousness) has been differentiated from attention to the self as a social object, i.e., 
through the eyes of others (public self-consciousness; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). 
Mindfulness, a concept underlying modern mental health interventions based on Buddhist 
meditation traditions, has been extensively studied in the past few decades (Keng, Smoski, 
& Robins, 2011). Mindfulness can be described as a mode of awareness consisting of non-
evaluative, accepting attention to present moment-to-moment experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 
2015). More precisely, besides further facets, it encompasses the observation of sensations, 
perceptions, feelings and thoughts, as well as the labelling of these experiences with words 
(Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). Mindful affect labelling is a way of 
reporting one’s own feelings, and has been related to the internal regulation of negative 
emotions (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007). While introspection was 
measured through behavioral observation in Wundt’s laboratory (i.e., observing subjects 
verbalizing their experience), self-report measures are more commonly applied in current 
research (e.g., Mindfulness scale; Baer et al., 2006). The crucial ability to meta-represent 
specifically affective states was further explored in literature on individual differences in 
alexithymia. It was originally considered a subclinical trait defined as an impaired ability to 
identify and describe one’s own emotions (Taylor & Bagby, 2004). Its exact role in disturbed 
emotion processing in psychiatric conditions has been the subject of controversial debate 
(e.g., “alexithymic depression subtype”; Vanheule, Desmet, Verhaeghe, & Bogaerts, 2007; 




This brief outline demonstrates the relevance of metacognition for the relationship of 
the self with itself. But how does it simultaneously relate to specifically social functions? 
Even the most lonesome individuals use language, a social tool, to verbalize the contents of 
their introspection, an observation pointed out by Cummins (2013) in reference to a famous 
example: “Even Descartes, in his presumed solipsistic introspection, expressed the thought 
`Cogito, ergo sum` in language – a means made possible only by recurrent practices of 
mutual coordination among individuals, and hence intersubjectively constituted in every 
way” (p. 416).1 Elucidating the role of metacognition in social interaction was recognized as 
a future issue for social cognition research some time ago (Frith & Frith, 2012), but is still 
waiting to receive adequate attention. It is this particular blind spot which the present 
dissertation addresses in what follows. 
1.1.3 MENTAL STATE COMMUNICATION 
I aim to broaden the theoretical perspective on social-cognitive abilities by focusing 
on metacognition and mindreading at the same time. First, I will briefly summarize the 
discussion regarding various accounts of the link between these two abilities. Then, I will 
embed both within the general concept of mental state communication. I will end this section 
by referring to an existing applied approach which hitherto has remained virtually unnoticed 
in academic literature.   
1.1.3.1 LINKING METACOGNITION AND MINDREADING  
The link between metacognition and mindreading has been proposed more or less 
explicitly by many authors. In a comprehensive article, Carruthers (2009) thoroughly 
categorizes various conceptions of this link as falling under four different accounts. Firstly, 
it has been argued that mindreading and metacognition are separate and independent 
(Nichols & Stich, 2003), but the existing literature has mainly focused on the question of 
their interdependence. One of Carruthers´ earlier ideas implies that they share the same 
social-cognitive mechanism to represent mental states but are dissociable due to differing 
modes of access to these states (perception-based in mindreading vs. introspective in 
metacognition). Another account is that metacognition is a precursor mechanism of 
                                               
1 The idea that language has evolved by or for social interaction remains, however, a controversial 
hypothesis (Chomsky, 1986; Tomasello, 2008). 
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mindreading, as in simulating other people’s mental states from a first-person perspective 
(“as if”-experience) enables individuals to infer their minds (e.g., Goldman, 2006). Finally, 
Carruthers defends the opposing claim, i.e., that mindreading is prior to metacognition. He 
argues that metacognition is based on “quasi-perceptual” inputs such as inner speech, 
imagery or somatosensation, and is thus ultimately inferential too (“turning our mindreading 
capacities upon ourselves”, p. 121), which might appear as a counterintuitive idea.2 His point 
of view suggests that metacognition and mindreading mechanisms are not strictly 
dissociable. 
More recent advancements in empirical social cognition research have further 
contributed to the understanding of the above relationship. For instance, emotion recognition 
deficits in autism have been shown to be predicted by alexithymia (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & 
Bird, 2013). Beyond its original definition as a selective impairment of emotional self-
awareness, alexithymia was found to be indicative of a general failure of interoception (i.e., 
bodily, visceral self-awareness) in neurotypical individuals as well as individuals with 
depression, anxiety, autism spectrum or eating disorder (Brewer, Cook, & Bird, 2016). 
Interoceptive awareness is considered the basis of a mental model of the embodied self (Seth, 
2013), and is actually associated with the ability to differentiate the self from others 
(Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2014). Interestingly, the predictive coding framework of 
social cognition (i.e., that the brain infers self- and other-representations by Bayesian 
reasoning; Moutoussis, Fearon, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014) deems interoception a 
critical factor in mindreading. In line with the above mentioned simulation account, the 
argument is that individuals also simulate the internal physical states of others to inform 
their mental state inferences (Ondobaka, Kilner, & Friston, 2017). From my point of view, 
this observation seems to imply a perfect reconciliation between the view that metacognition 
is a precursor mechanism of mindreading and Carruther’s account that metacognition is 
based on inferences derived from internal inputs.  
                                               
2 This idea is illustrated by Carruthers using the following example of a person becoming aware of 
the decision to retrieve a book: „His mindreading system has access to a variety of forms of evidence in addition 
to overt behavior (which in this case is lacking). The agent might, for example, have verbalized or partially 
verbalized his intention, in “inner speech.” And then, since inner speech utilizes the same perceptual systems 
that are involved in the hearing of speech (…), this will be available as input to the mindreading system. Or he 
might have formed a visual or proprioceptive image of himself selecting that particular book, which will be 
similarly available (…). Or the context provided by his prior verbalized thoughts and visual images, together 
with a shift in his attention towards the door, might make it natural to interpret himself as having decided to 




However, from the perspective of a social psychologist interested in naturalistic 
behavior, it is even more interesting to better understand the active employment of 
metacognition and mindreading in dynamic interpersonal communication. Introspecting and 
mindreading individuals may actually communicate their mental representations regarding 
the self and the other with each other. In what follows, I will introduce a general concept 
embedding the communicative manifestations of metacognition and mindreading. 
1.1.3.2 EMERGING CONCEPT 
Researchers across psychological disciplines have investigated self- or other-
understanding within professional and everyday communication. (Cognitive) Empathy, 
expressed through active listening, i.e., paraphrasing and reflecting what clients feel and 
think, was defined by Rogers (1957; Rogers & Farson, 1987) as a central condition of change 
in client-centered psychotherapy. Moreover, mentalizing about the feelings and thoughts of 
clients in the course of professional verbal interaction is considered generally important for 
the psychotherapeutic and medical effectiveness of clinicians (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 
2008; Larson & Yao, 2005). Regarding the effectiveness of salespersons, a fairly different 
kind of profession, the positive outcomes of mindreading through careful and active listening 
have also been studied (Comer & Drollinger, 1999; Drollinger, Comer, & Warrington, 
2006). Furthermore, research on communication behavior in romantic couples has 
continuously examined the role of emotional self-expression, and attentive listening to and 
exploration of the partner’s feelings and thoughts (Coan & Gottman, 2007; Pistrang, 
Picciotto, & Barker, 2001). Mothers´ mental state utterances were investigated in naturalistic 
interaction with their infants to examine how maternal language influences the development 
of children’s mental state language (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). Regarding 
adolescents´ communication, self-disclosure through talking about intimate feelings and 
thoughts (with peers or parents) was studied to better understand its role for their socio-
emotional development (Davis & Franzoi, 1986; Rivenbark, 1971). More generally, mutual 
sharing of subjective experience in communication was shown to be related to better 
individual and joint decision making since explaining, justifying and discussing with each 
other optimizes decisions (Frith & Frith, 2012). 
To sum up, the particular focus of past literature was mostly on mindreading or 
metacognition in various communication settings (though Gottman’s couple research 
focused on both). The notable fact that individuals in many personal and professional 
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contexts actually balance both simultaneously, or juggle them by constantly shifting roles, 
deserves closer attention. To my knowledge, a general and comprehensive concept, which 
incorporates the manifestations of metacognition and mindreading in naturalistic verbal 
communication has not been presented thus far.  
I conceptualize the verbal communication of mental states as the sharing of messages 
explicitly referring to one’s own or one’s communication partner’s mental states. More 
precisely, its components are defined as conveying one’s own mental states from a first-
person metacognitive perspective (e.g., “I feel…”,  “I believe that…”), and active listening 
to others´ mental states from a second-person mindreading perspective (e.g., “I guess you 
feel...”, “Do you think that…”). Following up on established terminology in the field, 
specifically the term mindreading, I use the term mindspeaking as a synonym of mental state 
communication. Figure 1.1 depicts the respective intersections of mindreading and 
metacognition with mental state communication as a concept emerging in between. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Mental state communication as a concept intersecting with mindreading and 
metacognition. 
This broader concept of mental state communication completes my earlier notion of 
empathic communication (i.e., active listening to another person’s mental states; Wacker, 
2011) by adding the act of communicating one’s own mental states. Importantly, I do not 
consider nonverbal communication of mental states. An extensive amount of psychological, 
anthropological and linguistic literature is dedicated to the study of facial, manual, postural 
or vocal gestures, all of which have a communicative function (e.g., affective vs. dominant 
smiles, shrugging shoulders, rolling eyes, etc.) beyond mere mental state expression 




Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010).3 However, the broad field of nonverbal 
communication is beyond the scope of the concept as introduced here. 
Mental state communication is presumably among the most sophisticated forms of 
social-cognitive interaction enabling advanced social behaviors. It might be employed, for 
instance, when political leaders navigate peace negotiations while attempting to integrate the 
desires of their in-group with the opaque belief and norm system of an out-group from a 
foreign culture. In personal life, mental state communication might be key for exploring and 
successfully integrating one another’s individual emotional makeup for the sake of 
maintaining a mutually satisfying long-term relationship. Among work colleagues, it might 
play a role in coordinating personal needs and interpersonal boundaries in the context of 
emotionally challenging occupational settings.  
These examples illustrate the ways in which mental state communication might be 
useful as a concept that integrates metacognition and mindreading in their naturalistic 
context: dynamic social interaction between individuals whose minds meet through verbal 
communication. So far, the meeting minds metaphor used by authors at the frontiers of social 
cognition research (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006) was limited to solitary or silent meetings - 
i.e., situations of minimal to no interaction among study participants – in the absence of 
verbal communication (but see empathic accuracy research; Mast & Ickes, 2006). Of note, 
social psychological investigations of naturalistic behavior show that individuals talk with 
others about emotional events in at least 90% of all cases (primary emotion sharing; Rimé, 
Philippot, Boca, & Mesquita, 1992), and that exposure to emotion sharing itself is 
experienced as emotion-inducing which in turn is shared in 66% of all cases (secondary 
emotion sharing; Christophe & Rimé, 1997). In current social cognition literature, the need 
for more ecologically valid assessment paradigms has already been pointed out (Dziobek, 
2012; Schilbach et al., 2013). Additionally, I suggest that it might be of value to consider 
mindspeaking as an ecologically valid concept for the study of naturally occurring social 
cognition in verbal action. 
                                               
3 The notion of communicative gestures refers to perceivable bodily actions with a semiotic or 





From an applied perspective, closely capturing the concept of mental state 
communication, Marshall B. Rosenberg introduced and trained the approach of nonviolent 
communication (NVC; Rosenberg, 2005). He studied under Carl Rogers and was influenced 
by his client-centered psychotherapy approach rooted in the tradition of humanistic 
psychology (Rogers, 1957). As a clinical psychologist and mediator, Rosenberg (2005; 
Rosenberg & Molho, 1998) described NVC as entailing the communication of  
(a) one’s non-evaluative observations,  
(b) one’s own feelings and needs without criticizing others,  
(c) clear, non-demanding requests towards others, and 
(d) empathic listening to the observations, feelings, needs, and requests of 
communication partners.  
NVC has neither been rooted in any broader social cognition framework or concept 
by Rosenberg, nor noticed by social cognition literature. However, it is evident that this 
approach emphasizes the identification and communication of one’s own and others´ mental 
states from a first- and second-person perspective, respectively. The following physician-
patient example illustrate NVC in tense interactions (Rosenberg & Molho, 1998; p. 339). 
“A 23-year-old patient contaminated with HIV came to a haemophilia center to ask 
for a prescription for anti-haemophilic factor; after the prescription was written, he 
asked the physician to add a sleeping pill. The physician, knowing that he was a drug 
addict, already using several sleeping pills, refused, and the patient got extremely 
angry (…), to which the physician responded by tearing up the prescription. (…). In 
such a case, a physician using NVC would have answered (…), `I am feeling worried 
about writing this prescription, and, as for any medication, I would like to better 
understand what is leading you to ask for it; are you having trouble sleeping?´ (…) 
Then, when the patient says ´anyway all your prescriptions are shit`, an empathic 
response using NVC would sound like: ´Are you still feeling angry about the HIV 
contamination and needing more understanding of how it has impaired your life?`”  
According to Rosenberg, this communication style is effective in the prevention or 
resolution of interpersonal conflict, as well as for individual wellbeing in social interactions 




experiences separately from such as defense, criticism or judgements. NVC is implemented 
in interventions targeting communication skills in various applied settings like healthcare, 
school education, social work, political conflict resolution, or rehabilitation programs in 
prisons (Center for Nonviolent Communication, 2016). Despite the widely spread 
international application of this approach, it has thus far won very little recognition in 
academic literature. No controlled effectiveness study has been published so far, nor a 
comprehensive assessment measure of NVC as originally conceptualized by Rosenberg 
developed. 
Therefore, in study 3 of this dissertation, we examined the effectiveness of NVC 
training in an intervention and a control group using a pre-post evaluation design within a 
naturalistic field setting. We developed a new questionnaire assessing NVC for this purpose. 
Additionally, an established coding system for the observation of naturalistic 
communication behavior (Discussion Coding System; Schermuly & Scholl, 2012) has been 
applied to objectively assess individuals´ verbalization of affective states from a first-person 
perspective to their communication partners in a group discussion.  
1.2 SOCIAL-COGNITIVE ABILITIES AND INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING 
Social cognition allows people to navigate the social world by building a subjective 
“social map” that includes representations of themselves, other people and the nature of the 
relationships between the self and others. These maps guide individuals through different 
“social landscapes” with changing situational affordances of personal and professional life. 
The construction of un-/differentiated, mal-/adaptive, accurate/biased representations 
depends on numerous social-cognitive abilities and processes (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Happé 
et al., 2017). Whatever the makeup of these internal representations might be, they 
unquestionably influence how individuals subjectively experience their interpersonal 
relatedness, and how they objectively behave in social interactions. 
As the preceding literature review has shown, mindreading and mental state 
communication play an important role for interpersonal functioning in personal relationships 
(e.g., parenting, romantic couples, peer friendships), as well as professional interactions 
(e.g., with clients, customers, colleagues at work). Within the framework of interpersonal 
theory (Kiesler, 1983), social experience and behavior can be generally characterized along 
two independent dimensions: affiliation and dominance (see Fig. 1.2). Dominance (or 
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agency) in relation to others is marked by competence, control, personal ambition, and goal-
orientation, while affiliation (or communion) represents cooperation, prosocial concern, 
integration of the self with others, and emotional expressivity (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007).  
These two dimensions of the interpersonal circumplex were used to describe and 
assess individual differences in general social dispositions as well as interpersonal problems 
(Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990; Wiggins, Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988), e.g., interpersonal 
fear and avoidance, exploitability, or lack of assertiveness (low dominance), and 
interpersonal indifference, coldness, withdrawal or hostility (low affiliation). The notion of 
these “Big Two” is supported by theoretical and empirical convergence in literature on social 
information processing and behavior (e.g., Abele & Wojciszke, 2013; Schröder, Netzel, 
Schermuly, & Scholl, 2013), and is thus viewed as an approach potentially integrating 
diverse psychological research targeting the interpersonal domain. 
Figure 1.2. Affiliation (horizontal axis) and dominance (vertical axis) within the 
interpersonal circumplex describing basic interpersonal dispositions (Wiggins et al., 1988) 
and problems (in parentheses; Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990). 
Considering once more the integrative approach of this dissertation, I take a 
perspective across clinical and occupational health psychology in investigating the role of 
social cognition in low interpersonal functioning with a focus on fear, avoidance, distress 
and conflict (all characterized by low dominance and low affiliation). In the following two 
sections, I will briefly review literature demonstrating that social-cognitive processes and 
mechanisms are related to the mentioned interpersonal affects and behaviors in adults with 





1.2.1 ADULTS WITH PATHOLOGICAL FEAR OF SOCIAL EVALUATION  
An excessive fear of social or performance situations potentially bearing negative 
evaluations by others (e.g., scrutiny, embarrassment, rejection, criticism, or humiliation), 
and avoidance of these situations constitute central diagnostic criteria of social anxiety 
disorder (SAD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It is one of the most common 
psychiatric conditions, given a lifetime prevalence of 12% in US-American (Kessler, 
Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005), and close to 7% in European samples (Fehm, 
Pelissolo, Furmark, & Wittchen, 2005; Lecrubier et al., 2000). SAD is associated with an 
impaired ability to initiate and maintain social relationships, as well as lower occupational 
success and socio-economic status (Lecrubier et al., 2000). What contributes to the 
pathological fear of being evaluated as socially inadequate or incompetent?  
Cognitive models of SAD emphasize the role of attentional and interpretational 
biases in social situations in the maintenance of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark & 
McManus, 2002). Indeed, various studies show that socially anxious individuals are 
negatively biased to process neutral or ambiguous social information, e.g., others´ gaze, 
facial expressions, or verbal statements as aversive, threatening, angry, or judgmental (e.g., 
Amir et al., 1998; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Schulze, Renneberg, & Lobmaier, 2013; Stopa 
& Clark, 2000). Following the SAD model of Clark and Wells (1995), negative social 
interpretations (e.g., “Others are angry at me/dislike me”, “I am failing”) and the resulting 
anxiety are further amplified by a strong focus on the self as a social object (e.g., “Others 
see me failing”), and maintained by avoidant and safety behaviors as well as self-monitoring 
thoughts used to prevent the expected negative social reactions (e.g., rehearsing 
conversations and actions in extreme detail). 
The intense fear of social evaluation present in SAD sufferers is shared by individuals 
affected by body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), though their concerns are specifically related 
to negative judgements of their physical appearance (Fang & Hofmann, 2010; Pinto & 
Phillips, 2005). This condition has been referred to as “imagined ugliness” (Phillips, 1991), 
and is defined as a dysfunctional preoccupation with a perceived defect in one’s own 
appearance (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It used to be categorized as a 
somatoform disorder in older versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and is currently viewed as an 
obsessive-compulsive-related disorder since a newly added diagnostic criterion refers to 
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compulsive behaviors and mental acts, e.g., mirror checking, camouflaging, and appearance 
comparisons (Hartmann & Buhlmann, 2017). Importantly, individuals with BDD experience 
equally strong self- and social-evaluative appearance anxiety (Anson, Veale, & Silva, 2012), 
and often have delusional ideas of reference, e.g., “Everyone is staring at me/talking about 
me” (Phillips et al., 2010). The prevalence amounts to 2.4% in the US (Koran, Abujaoude, 
Large, & Serpe, 2008), and 1.8% in Germany (Buhlmann et al., 2010). Both BDD and SAD, 
typically set on in early adolescence or childhood, and their comorbidity in different studies 
varies between 12-68.8% for SAD in BDD, and 4.8-12% for BDD in SAD (Fang & 
Hofmann, 2010).  
Similar to the aforementioned social-cognitive accounts of SAD, a negative 
interpretation bias for ambiguous social information is considered to play a crucial role in 
maintaining BDD (Buhlmann, McNally, Etcoff, Tuschen-Caffier, & Wilhelm, 2004; 
Buhlmann, McNally, Wilhelm, & Florin, 2002; Feusner, Neziroglu, Wilhelm, Mancusi, & 
Bohon, 2010), and is therefore discussed in the context of nosological overlap of SAD and 
BDD (Fang & Hofmann, 2010). Whereas individuals with SAD tend to interpret social 
information as evidence for their personal incompetence or inadequacy, individuals with 
BDD are biased to interpret social information as evidence for their unattractiveness (e.g., 
“Others find me ugly/disgusting”). Furthermore, the compulsive checking rituals in BDD 
can be understood as avoidance and safety behaviors (Neziroglu, Khemlani-Patel, & Veale, 
2008), and as functionally analogous to the behavioral strategies in SAD as described above.  
In sum, these striking similarities call for a transdiagnostic approach to SAD and 
BDD to better understand the role of social-cognitive mechanisms in conditions 
characterized by a pathological fear of social evaluation. The general idea of transdiagnostic 
or translational research is to investigate common underlying functional mechanisms across 
different disorders, which can be viewed as a more progressive approach towards psychiatric 
diagnosis (as prominently proposed by the Research Domain Criteria project of the National 
Institute of Mental Health; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). This transdiagnostic perspective is 
reflected in study 2 of this dissertation. My co-authors and I examined the mindreading 
profile of adults with SAD and BDD in comparison with a clinical and a typically developing 
control group using the MASC as a naturalistic paradigm representative of a third-person 





1.2.2 TYPICALLY DEVELOPING ADULTS IN HEALTH PROFESSIONS 
In occupational health and organizational psychology, social-cognitive as well as 
emotional abilities have been widely acknowledged as crucial factors of interpersonal 
effectiveness and socio-emotional experience in interactions with clients, colleagues and 
supervisors (Ferris et al., 2002; Grandey, 2000). For instance, much attention has been 
directed to the link between emotional intelligence and social skills at work, e.g., leadership 
effectiveness (Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 2001), or conflict resolution (Jordan & Troth, 
2002). The latter is particularly important since interpersonal conflict and disharmonious 
relationships at work cause depressive symptoms in employees (e.g., Dormann & Zapf, 
2002). Therefore, like most employees working in teams and organizations, health 
professionals are faced with the general job demand of managing relationships with 
colleagues and supervisors, including potential conflict and social stressors at work. 
Working in the health sector, however, can be even more socioemotionally 
challenging since jobs aimed at healing, helping or supporting others demand particularly 
good interpersonal functioning in interactions with clients and patients (Hochschild, 1983; 
Grandey, 2000). Literature on counseling and psychotherapy underscored early on that 
“empathic understanding of the client’s internal frame of reference” (Rogers, 1957; p. 96) is 
a central therapeutic factor, an observation continuously supported by later studies (Lambert 
& Barley, 2001; Patterson, 1984). A similar view was also adopted in medical psychology 
by focusing on the importance of “clinical empathy” for the quality of the physician-patient 
relationship (Larson & Yao, 2005), but also on its complex role in the etiology of emotional 
exhaustion and job burnout in physicians (e.g., Lamothe, Boujut, Zenasni, & Sultan, 2014), 
which is not surprising given that interactions with suffering clients can be viewed as 
emotional labor consisting of potentially effortful emotion regulation work (Grandey, 2000; 
Hochschild, 1983). Within this line of research, empathy was usually conceptualized as a 
multidimensional concept (Davis, 1983) with a cognitive (i.e. taking the psychological 
perspective of others) and an affective component (i.e., other-oriented, empathic concern), 
while empathic distress represents the opposite affective response (i.e., self-oriented anxious 
withdrawal form others; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). I suggest that it reflects low 
affiliation and low dominance within the interpersonal circumplex. Empathic concern, on 
the other hand, is strongly affiliative and moderately dominant as it implies compassionate 
initiative and protective control. Notably, more recent accounts in social cognition research 
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stress that the ability to differentiate another person’s psychological perspective from one’s 
own, i.e. self-other distinction (Happé et al., 2017), is highly relevant for interpersonal 
functioning in health professionals in terms of regulating empathic distress in 
socioemotionally challenging interactions that require a compassionate rather than self-
oriented response (e.g., Klimecki & Singer, 2012; Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Klimecki and 
Singer (2012) point out that “the realization of being different from the suffering person 
without being indifferent towards him or her is an important prerequisite for the development 
of prosocial behavior” (p. 378). Hence, the vital question is, what could promote health 
professionals´ ability to differentiate the mental states of (suffering) others form their own, 
and vice versa, in order to prevent low interpersonal functioning given their professional role 
as empathic healers?  
Study 3 of this dissertation addresses this question by emphasizing mental state 
communication, i.e., active listening to others´ mental states from a second-person 
mindreading perspective and conveying one’s own mental states from a first-person 
metacognitive perspective (see section 1.1.3.2). Since NVC represents a promising practical 
application of mental state communication (see section 1.1.3.3), we evaluated an NVC 
training in health professionals in a public health organization by investigating its effects on 
self-reported and objectively observed mental state communication skills, and on 
perspective taking, empathic concern, empathic distress and social stressors at work. Studies 
examining interventions aimed at training social-cognitive abilities and promoting 
interpersonal functioning in typically developing adults are just as scarce as literature on 
neurotypical variation in social cognition (Turner & Felisberti, 2017). Given this research 
gap, it is necessary to examine intervention approaches for this population, especially for 
professionals with occupational roles explicitly requiring good interpersonal functioning. 
1.3 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AIMS 
This work is motivated by the endeavor to take a bird’s eye view on the multifaceted 
landscape of studies in social cognition and beyond. By bringing together diverging lines of 
research traditions from different psychological disciplines, the general aim of this 
dissertation is to advance an integrative perspective on social-cognitive abilities and their 
role in interpersonal functioning across adults with (different) psychiatric conditions and 
typically developing adults. Working towards this goal was realized in three empirical 




Study 1: Gender and Age Effects on Mindreading in Typically Developing Adults  
Combining social psychological, biological, and developmental perspectives to characterize 
gender- and age-related individual differences in mindreading performance in typically 
developing adults on the basis of a sensitive, reliable and ecologically valid paradigm. 
Study 2: Mindreading in Adults with Pathological Fear of Social Evaluation            
Taking a transdiagnostic perspective on social cognition deficits in pathological social 
evaluation fear by comparing mindreading profiles of adults with SAD and BDD with a 
clinical and a typically developing control group. 
Study 3: Training Mental State Communication in Typically Developing Adults in Health 
Professions 
Evaluating the effects of an NVC training on mental state communication skills, perspective 
taking, empathic concern, empathic distress and social stressors at work in typically 
developing adults in health professions using a pre-post design in a field setting, including a 
newly developed NVC questionnaire and an established coding system for the observation 
of naturalistic communication behavior. 
 
Figure 1.3. Overview of concepts and study foci.  
Note. Theoretical variable locations within the interpersonal circumplex (see Fig. 1.2) are 
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2 STUDY I: GENDER AND AGE EFFECTS ON MINDREADING IN 
TYPICALLY DEVELOPING ADULTS 4 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT  
Research recurrently shows that females perform better than males on various 
mindreading tasks. The present study contributes to this growing body of literature by being 
the first to demonstrate a female own-gender mindreading bias using a naturalistic social 
cognition paradigm including female and male targets. We found that women performed 
better at reading others´ minds, and that they were specifically more capable to read female 
targets, an own-gender target effect absent in men. Furthermore, a non-linear negative effect 
of perceiver age on mindreading performance was examined within a sample covering the 
age range of 17-70 years, as indicated by a stronger performance decrease setting on by the 
age of 30 years and continuing throughout middle and old age. These findings add to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the contextual factors influencing mindreading 
performance in typically developing adults. 
  
                                               
4  This study has previously been published as: 
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2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Much of social interaction occurs “in silence”, as people exchange information about 
emotions, thoughts, and intentions in implicit ways. Thus, everyday social life requires us to 
hypothesize based on our interaction partners´ nonverbal expressions and behaviors, implicit 
or ambiguous verbal messages, and actions conveying thoughts and intentions indirectly. 
This social-cognitive capacity to infer others´ emotional, cognitive, or motivational mental 
states is referred to as mindreading. It relies on various visual, verbal and symbolic cues 
(e.g., facial expressions, voice, gestures, body movements) occurring in social interaction. 
Thus, the abilities serving this capacity range from emotion recognition and empathic 
accuracy to attributing intentions, inferring thoughts, Faux pas and false beliefs 
understanding. Social psychological research increasingly recognizes the crucial role of 
contextual factors, e.g., perceiver characteristics or perceiver-target interactions, for a better 
understanding of the interpersonal functions of mindreading beyond its intrapersonal 
mechanisms and neural correlates (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011; Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). 
Research recurrently demonstrates that females perform better on various 
mindreading tasks such as mindreading accuracy (Thomas & Fletcher, 2003), mental state 
inference (Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013), Faux Pas understanding 
(Ahmed & Miller, 2011), facial expression processing (McClure, 2000), or emotion labeling 
(Montagne, Kessels, Frigerio, de Haan, & Perrett, 2005). Gender differences in mindreading 
have been linked to biological sex differences. Although this account is not uncontroversial 
(Valla et al., 2010), Baron-Cohen (2002) proposes that the “typical female” brain would 
engage more strongly in understanding mental states of (social) agents, whereas the “typical 
male brain” tends to analyze non-agentic systems. Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Batki, and Ahluwalia (2000) actually observed sex-specific stimuli preferences in newborns 
(face in females vs. moving mobile in males). This study is the only one demonstrating such 
early sex differences using these two objects. However, it has also been found that female 
newborns have a stronger interest in eye contact as compared to male newborns (Hittelman 
& Dickes, 1979). These early sex differences are assumed to initiate sex-specific integration 
of brain systems, which develop as differences in social perception and cognition (Byrd-
Craven & Geary, 2013; McGuinness & Pribram, 1979). Differences in interest also seem to 
exist in adult life since women prefer to work with people, and men with things (Cohen’s d 
= .9 in the meta-analysis by Su, Rounds, and Armstrong, 2009). 
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It has been debated whether women have a higher ability or “just” a stronger 
motivation to read others´ minds. Since this controversy started (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 
2000), the performance enhancing effects of the specifically female gender role motivation 
to be an accurate mindreader have been examined (e.g., Thomas & Maio, 2008). Hodges, 
Laurent and Lewis (2011) conclude that despite higher mindreading motivation “women 
probably hold a slight general edge over men” (p. 59) given the consistently found female 
advantage even in the absence of motivational factors. They further relate it to some specific 
features of the female standard stimulus person used in these studies, speculating that a 
female target might appeal stronger to women than to men. Unfortunately, this line of 
research did not consider the possible interaction of perceiver gender and target gender 
systematically. In face recognition literature, however, a bias for own-gender targets in 
women but not in men has been consistently reported (Herlitz & Lovén, 2013; Lewin & 
Herlitz, 2002). Herlitz and Lovén (2013) provide a developmental explanation by arguing 
that female newborns´ stronger interest for faces, and the fact that their primary caregivers 
are women, result in perceptual expertise for female faces based on mutual reinforcement of 
preference and familiarity over time. Females´ stronger tendency to establish more intimate 
“face-to-face” same-gender friendships (as opposed to males´ activity oriented “side-by-
side” friendships) might further strengthen their same-gender face recognition bias 
(Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007). Face perception is considered as one core mechanism of social 
cognition since Schultz et al. (2003) had provided evidence for the notion that the fusiform 
face area, a region specialized for face perception, also represents semantic information 
about “peopleness” (personal agency), and is thus involved in attributing mental states to 
objects. This basic idea, i.e., that recognizing people’s faces is linked to reading their mental 
states, combined with the mentioned developmental explanation for the own-gender face 
recognition bias in women leads to the question whether a specifically female own-gender 
mindreading bias actually exists. We argue that females´ perceptual expertise for female 
faces presumably also facilitates their social-cognitive expertise for female minds. 
Age is another perceiver variable affecting the ability to understand other people’s 
mental states. While earlier evidence had suggested a positive effect of age on mindreading 
as a manifestation of increasing “social wisdom” (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), a 
more recent meta-analytic review clearly demonstrated that younger adults perform better 
on mindreading tasks than older adults across various domains (affective/cognitive/mixed) 
and modalities (verbal/visual, static/dynamic; Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). 
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Yet, most of these findings rely upon performance differences between extreme age groups, 
not continuous age data. Therefore, a comprehensive picture of adult mindreading 
performance in women and men across the whole adult lifespan is still lacking. An exception 
is evidence derived from a sample of > 70,000 adults (18-90 yrs.) indicating an inverted u-
shaped relationship of age and self-reported perspective taking with a performance peak at 
50-60 years (O’Brien, Konrath, Grühn, & Hagen, 2012). This hints towards a positive 
relationship between age and mindreading until mature adulthood, and a negative 
relationship in old age. Though perspective taking captures only one aspect of the ability to 
read other people’s minds, this result does not fit well with other literature on aging and 
mindreading as younger adult groups have been almost consistently found to perform better 
on mindreading tasks as compared to any older age group. However, the finding reported by 
O’Brien and colleagues suggests a possible non-linear relationship between age and 
mindreading but the exact nature of this relationship has yet to be investigated on the basis 
of a more objective task measuring various components of mindreading. 
In the present study, we examined effects of perceiver gender and age, and target 
gender on mindreading performance as assessed with an ecologically valid test that captures 
the broad composite of everyday mindreading targeting multiple characters of both genders. 
We hypothesized (i) a perceiver gender effect on mindreading, i.e. women perform better 
than men; (ii) a specifically female own-gender mindreading bias, i.e. women read female 
targets more accurately than male targets; (iii) a negative non-linear relationship of perceiver 
age and mindreading. 
2.3 MATERIALS AND METHODS  
Participants 
The presented data are based on a multi-site data collection comprising 14 studies 
conducted in Germany (e.g., Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren, & Roepke, 2010; Ritter et 
al., 2011; Montag et al., 2011; Buhlmann, Wacker, & Dziobek, 2015). Only data from 
typically developing participants were used for the current analyses while individuals with 
documented clinical diagnosis were excluded. The resulting total sample (N = 545) 
comprised 304 females (56%), and 241 males (44%). This large and statistically powerful 
sample of convenience was used with no a priori sample size calculation. Participants´ 
average age was M = 31.93 years (SD = 11.42; range: 17.62-70.00), and their mean duration 
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of education was M = 13.49 years (SD = 2.67; range: 9.00-20.00).5 Females were 
significantly older (M = 32.95, SD = 12.15) than males (M = 30.63, SD = 10.32; p = 0.16). 
No gender difference was present for education duration. The studies were approved by the 
respective local ethics committees, e.g., Ethics Committee of Charité - Universitätsmedizin 
Berlin. Two of the 14 studies included typically developing individuals only and, thus, did 
not legally require ethics approvals for collecting behavioural data with our measure. In 
addition, all subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
Measure 
Mindreading was measured with The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition 
(MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). The MASC is an explicit mindreading performance test based 
on a narrative fictional film providing naturalistic verbal and non-verbal stimuli of dynamic 
social interaction. It captures affective and cognitive mental state inference, such as Theory 
of Mind, emotion recognition and perspective taking. It includes four targets who exhibit the 
full variety of verbal and non-verbal information, and express their emotions, thoughts and 
intentions in dynamic interaction. The 15-minute movie is about two female and two male 
middle aged adults preparing and getting together for dinner, and focuses on their social 
communication and interaction. The movie is stopped 45 times in order to inquire about the 
characters’ thoughts, intentions or emotions (e.g., “What is Cliff thinking?”, “Why is Betty 
saying this?”, “What is Michael feeling?”). The response format of the current MASC 
version is a multiple-choice structure with one correct response and three distractors for each 
of the 45 questions. The possible total scores range from 0 to 45, and the subscore for 
female/male targets from 0 to 100%. Subscores represent the percentage of correctly 
answered items (based on 26 items targeting female characters, and 18 items targeting male 
characters; one item targets 3 characters at once, and thus is not included). The MASC was 
administered with Microsoft Office PowerPoint or Presentation. In the original validation 
study (Dziobek et al., 2006) high correlations of the MASC score with social functioning 
were found in individuals on the autism spectrum, and the test has been shown to have high 
                                               
5 Information on education was available for N=229. 
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test-retest reliability (ICC = .97). For further details with regard to test development, stimuli 
and administration see Dziobek and colleagues (2006).  
We assessed the psychometric properties of the MASC based on classical item 
analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. A larger sample of N = 713 with 56% female and 
44% male participants was available for this purpose.6 Participants´ average age was M = 
30.80 years (SD = 11.62; range: 12.61-70.00) and their mean duration of education was M = 
14.02 years (SD = 2.26; range: 9.00-20.00).7 The item analysis (item difficulties, item-total 
correlations) and reliability analysis in terms of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) were 
performed using SPSS 21.0, and the confirmatory factor analysis for categorical data was 
conducted with Mplus 6.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010-2012). Mc Donald’s (1999) omega was 
computed based on the estimated item-loadings.  
The average MASC total score was M = 34.15 (SD = 5.25; Mdn = 35.00) and ranged 
from 9 to 45. The item difficulty as represented by item mean ranged from M = .52 (Item 
35) to M = .94 (Item 11 and 45). The item-total correlations ranged from "#$ = .08 (Item 13) 
to "#$ = .37 (Item 11 and 28). To assess the assumption of unidimensionality the confirmatory 
factor analysis was performed with only one latent factor using the WMSLV estimation 
method. The RMSEA indicated good model fit, but the CFI and TLI were below the 
threshold for acceptability of .95 (%&(945) = 1261.08, p<.05; CFI = .83; TLI = .82; RMSEA 
= .022). The discrepancy between the CFI, TLI and the RMSEA could be explained by the 
relatively low average tetrachoric correlation between the items. The factor loadings of the 
unidimensional model ranged from '(# = .16 (Item 04) to '(# = .71 (Item 11), indicating that 
item 04 has the lowest and item 11 the highest association with the latent factor. The 
estimated communalities ranged from ℎ*#& = .02 (Item 13) to ℎ*#& = .50 (Item 11), referring to 
the relative proportion of the latent response variable’s variance that is explained by the 
factor. The threshold parameters ranged from  +̂# = -1.59 (Item 11) to +̂# = -.07 (Item 35), 
which means that item 11 is the easiest and item 35 the most difficult item to solve. 
Cronbach’s - based on the classical item analysis was .74, and Mc Donald’s . was .88. The 
results of the classical item analysis and confirmatory factor analysis are displayed in the 
Appendix (see Supplementary Material), allowing for a detailed overview of the items’ 
psychometric properties. 
                                               
6 Information on gender was available for N=548. 
7 Information on age was available for N=632, and on education for N=354. 
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The MASC is widely used in clinical studies as a sensitive test of mindreading 
deficits in, e.g., autism (Dziobek et al., 2006; Preißler et al., 2010; Buhlmann et al., 2015), 
and also recognized as a suitable measure of individual differences in typically developing 
adults (Turner, & Felisberti, 2017). Examination of the psychometric properties in the 
present study’s sample demonstrated that the MASC is an internally consistent, 
unidimensional test of medium difficulty well-suited to assess individual differences in 
mindreading. 
Statistical Analyses 
To assess the relationships between perceiver gender, perceiver age, and mindreading 
performance, we conducted a multiple robust regression of MASC total score on age 
(centered) and gender (dummy coded, 0 = female, 1 = male), using the package “robustbase” 
(Hlavac, 2015) of the software R 3.1.0 (R Core Team, 2013) due to its robustness against 
outliers.8 We also included the quadratic term of age (centered) in order to examine its non-
linear effect. Secondly, we performed a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANCOVA in SPSS to 
examine the interaction effect of perceiver gender (between-subject factor) and target gender 
(within-subject factor) on MASC subscores (age and age squared were both centered and 
entered as covariates). Post hoc within- and between-group comparisons were Bonferroni 
corrected, and group differences were compared by effect size as measured by partial eta 
squared.  
2.4 RESULTS 
Effects of Perceiver Gender and Perceiver Age on Mindreading Performance 
Participants´ predicted MASC score was equal to 35.609 - 1.067 (Gender) - 0.074 
(Age) - 0.004 (Age2), R2 = .121. Gender predicted mindreading performance with males 
scoring lower on the MASC than females (p = .005). Age was a negative predictor (p = .002), 
and the quadratic term of age was also significant (p = .005), indicating a non-linear 
relationship of age and mindreading during adulthood. As illustrated by Figure 2.1, the 
decrease of MASC score was more pronounced in middle and old adult age than in late 
                                               
8 Seven participants scored lower than 3 standard deviations below the MASC mean score. 
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adolescence and young adulthood (<30 years). There was no evidence for a significant age 
x gender interaction effect. 
Figure 2.1. Nonlinear relationship between age and mindreading performance for females 
and males. 
Interaction Effect of Perceiver Gender and Target Gender on Mindreading Performance 
We found a trend for an interaction effect of perceiver and target gender on 
mindreading performance, F(1,541) = 2.81, p = .09, η2 = .005, 95% CI (.000, .024). Post hoc 
within-group comparisons (Fig. 2.2) revealed that subscores for own-gender targets (M = 
80.34, SE = 0.84) were significantly higher as compared to other-gender targets (M = 76.76, 
SE = 0.94) in female participants, F(1,541) = 17.84, p < .001, η2 = .032, 95% CI (.009, .066), 
whereas the reverse pattern occurred in male participants (own-gender targets: M = 75.36, 
SE = 0.99; other-gender targets: M = 77.26, SE = 0.88; F[1,541] = 4.53, p = .03, η2 = .008, 
95% CI [.000, .030]). Post hoc between-group comparisons indicated that females´ subscore 
for female targets was significantly higher than males´ subscore for female targets, F(1,541) 
= 9.66, p = .002, η2 = .018, 95% CI (.002, .045), and that subscores for male targets did not 
differ significantly between females and males, F(1,541) = 1.57, p = .211, η2 = .003, 95% 
CI (.000, .019). In addition to the interaction effect, the main effect of target gender was 
significant with higher mindreading performance for female targets (M = 77.20, SE = 0.49) 
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than male targets (M = 75.21, SE = 0.55), F(1,541) = 14.89, p < .001, η2 = .027, 95% CI 
(.007, .059). 
 
Figure 2.2. Interaction effect of perceiver and target gender on mindreading performance. 
Note. Age (covariate) is evaluated at the level of 31.93 years. Error bars represent ±1 SE. * 
p < .05, *** p < .001. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
We provide evidence that women are better able than men to infer other women’s 
mental states. This result specifies the understanding of gender effects which have been 
reported by previous research showing that women hold an advantage over men across 
various components of mindreading (Kirkland et al., 2013; McClure, 2000; Montagne et al., 
2005; Thomas & Fletcher, 2003; Ahmed & Miller, 2011). In the present study, women 
outperformed men particularly when asked to read female targets, whereas no such own-
gender bias was found in men. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence to 
demonstrate the specifically female own-gender mindreading bias. It parallels the gender 
effects repeatedly found in face recognition literature showing that women have a stronger 
advantage in recognizing female faces (Herlitz & Lovén, 2013). How could females´ 
perceptual expertise for female faces have developed into a social-cognitive expertise for 
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female minds? First, we assume an equal-mindreaders effect. Apart from women’s interest 
for and familiarity with other females, their bias might be further reinforced by higher 
reciprocity in interactions with females possessing equal social-cognitive skills as compared 
to male mindreaders with relatively lower skills, and thus draw females more towards equal 
interaction partners throughout their social-cognitive development. Additionally, positive 
relationship outcomes of mindreading and perspective taking, such as greater intimacy and 
closeness (Chow, Ruhl, & Buhrmester, 2013), might further reinforce reciprocal 
mindreading between females, since women seek talking and emotion sharing in same-
gender friendships more than men (Caldwell, & Peplau, 1982). Another developmental 
explanation is a superior-mindreader effect, which could manifest the female own-gender 
bias especially during adolescence. This period’s most important developmental task is 
identity formation (Kroger, Martinussen, & Marcia, 2010; Erikson, 1968). Possibly, seeking 
self-understanding motivates young females to engage in astute social communication with 
older and “wiser” women, since the recursive nature of social-cognitive inferences (“I think 
that she thinks that I believe…”) allows for learning about one’s own thoughts and feelings 
through the reflection of the self in the mind of another. Given that women are better 
mindreaders than men, adolescents might prefer them for the sake of better self-
understanding. Adolescent girls actually self-disclose more with their mother than father, 
whereas boys share less with their father than mother (Rivenbark, 1971). This interaction 
pattern seems to persist beyond adolescence since women generally disclose more than men 
towards same-gender targets (Dindia & Allen, 1992). Finally, the female own-gender 
mindreading bias could be also explained by the fact that women are more stimulating as a 
target of mindreading. They have shown to be more emotionally expressive than men (Gross, 
& John, 1995), and therefore might provide richer input and a stronger appeal for others to 
read them. This could also account for men’s higher performance in reading female targets 
as compared to male targets in our sample. However, female targets´ expressivity might 
specifically interact with other womens´ higher mindreading ability, thus resulting in a better 
understanding of a more expressive target by a more astute perceiver.  
Taken together, we propose various mechanisms of the specifically female own-
gender bias in mindreading: Women are better at understanding other females´ feelings and 
thoughts because interactions with other women might offer them higher reciprocity of 
mindreading skills, a realization of their relationship motives (e.g., emotion sharing), self-
reflection with a superior mindreader (especially during adolescence), and a more 
stimulating, emotionally expressive target of mindreading. These putative mechanisms 
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should be further examined in future research to better understand why the female own-
gender bias exists.    
Furthermore, the non-linear negative effect of age on mindreading performance 
found in the present study extends the existing literature on age and social cognition by 
providing a more differentiated picture of mindreading across the adult life span. The vast 
majority of previous studies relied upon mean differences between extreme age groups 
and/or lacking groups representing mature adulthood. These designs were not suited to detect 
non-linear trajectories across the entire adult life span. Our regression analysis using age-
continuous data ranging from 17-70 years shows the onset of a negative trajectory by the age 
of approximately 30 years, and continuation throughout middle and old age. A non-linear 
effect of age on perspective taking was already reported by O'Brien and colleagues (2012). 
Their results differed as they found an inverted u-shaped trajectory peaking around 50-60 
years. However, perspective taking represents only a very specific component of 
mindreading which, especially when measured via self-report, might be confounded with a 
prosocial motivation (i.e. willingness to take the perspective of another). Prosociality itself 
increases with age (Sze, Gyurak, Goodkind, & Levenson, 2012). The more objective 
mindreading test used in the present study is presumably less prone to motivational 
confounds, and thus, better suited to measure actual performance differences related to age. 
Our results further complement to the literature on social-cognitive ageing as they are based 
on a naturalistic measure assessing the various components of everyday mindreading in a 
more comprehensive fashion as compared to previous studies, which for instance focused 
either on Theory of Mind or emotion labeling. 
Since we did not use longitudinal data, a cohort effect could have possibly 
confounded the age effect. In order to explore this we repeated the regression analysis with 
a MASC total score reduced by 7 items which might be biased by specific (lack of) 
knowledge or social norms probably present in older participants (e.g., traditional view 
regarding the role of female host). The results, however, did not change which indicates 
genuinely age-related performance differences. Nonetheless, it should be replicated with 
longitudinal data to exclude the possibility of cohort effects. Another limitation of our 
analysis is the missing inclusion of indicators of general cognitive ability. The negative age 
effect on mindreading appears to be similar to age-related differences in general cognitive 
performance (Salthouse, 2009). However, previous literature has shown that the negative 
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relationship of age and mindreading is only partly associated with age-related general 
cognitive impairments such as executive functioning and fluid intelligence (Moran, 2013). 
Finally, we cannot exclude the possible performance enhancing effect of the overt task 
demand given that participants are explicitly asked to infer the MASC characters´ mental 
states. At the same time, the test does not produce ceiling performance effects and is a 
psychometrically sound measure of the individual differences presented in this study. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This work contributes to the growing literature on the contextual factors of 
mindreading such as perceiver and target characteristics. By using a mindreading test that 
includes female as well as male targets, we demonstrated a specifically female own-gender 
bias in the ability to understand what others think and feel. The proposed social-cognitive 
mechanism and developmental factors of this bias have to be examined in following studies. 
The negative non-linear age effect on mindreading, marked by age-related 
performance differences setting on by the age of approximately 30 years, further clarifies 
how this ability might differ throughout adult life. This finding, however, has to be replicated 
with longitudinal age data in future research. 
Finally, other than many of the previous studies on mindreading (or specific 
components thereof), the results of the present work rely upon a naturalistic social cognition 
test that captures the broadness of various mindreading components, and accurately assesses 
subtle individual differences in typically developing adults. As has been already suggested 
elsewhere (Turner, & Felisberti, 2017), using this kind of measures in mindreading studies 
contributes to the validity of research findings and their applicability to everyday social life. 
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Table 2.1. MASC item analysis and confirmatory factor analysis (N = 713) 
# M "#$ 	'(# 	ℎ*#& +̂# 
01 .83 .24 .41 .17 -.97 
02 .83 .23 .41 .16 -.94 
03 .60 .14 .23 .05 -.25 
04 .59 .12 .16 .03 -.24 
05 .81 .23 .39 .15 -.88 
06 .73 .20 .29 .09 -.63 
07 .81 .29 .49 .24 -.89 
08 .81 .21 .37 .14 -.88 
09 .72 .21 .33 .11 -.57 
10 .80 .20 .31 .10 -.83 
11 .94 .34 .71 .50 -1.59 
12 .63 .09 .17 .03 -.32 
13 .62 .08 .13 .02 -.32 
14 .67 .20 .30 .09 -.45 
15 .68 .21 .35 .12 -.47 
16 .87 .29 .50 .25 -1.11 
17 .90 .23 .43 .18 -1.26 
18 .92 .22 .44 .20 -1.38 
19 .74 .20 .31 .10 -.65 
20 .91 .32 .60 .35 -1.32 
21 .55 .19 .29 .08 -.12 
22 .70 .20 .30 .09 -.52 
23 .79 .33 .52 .27 -.82 
24 .86 .27 .45 .21 -1.07 
25 .89 .28 .51 .26 -1.22 
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Table 2.1. (continued) 
Item M "#$ 	'(# 	ℎ*#& +̂# 
26 .55 .19 .31 .10 -.13 
27 .85 .23 .41 .17 -1.05 
28 .92 .34 .66 .44 -1.43 
29 .76 .18 .28 .08 -0.72 
30 .79 .24 .39 .15 -.80 
31 .65 .19 .29 .09 -.38 
32 .65 .28 .44 .20 -.40 
33 .76 .29 .46 .21 -.71 
34 .83 .22 .38 .14 -.96 
35 .53 .16 .26 .07 -.07 
36 .92 .25 .50 .25 -1.39 
37 .60 .17 .25 .06 -.26 
38 .85 .33 .54 .29 -1.03 
39 .83 .12 .19 .04 -.96 
40 .63 .14 .21 .04 -.33 
41 .84 .28 .45 .21 -.99 
42 .48 .24 .36 .13 -.06 
43 .72 .10 .17 .03 -.60 
44 .86 .28 .49 .24 -1.07 
45 .94 .21 .44 .20 -1.58 
Note. Coding of item responses: 0 = wrong, 1 = right; "#$ = item-total correlation, '(# = 
estimated standardized loading, ℎ*#& = communality, +̂#= estimated threshold parameter; "#$ 
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3 STUDY 2: MINDREADING IN ADULTS WITH PATHOLOGICAL 
FEAR OF SOCIAL EVALUATION9 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT  
Background: Social anxiety disorder (SAD) and body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) 
are characterized by fears of negative evaluation by others (related to ones own 
incompetence or flawed appearance, respectively). Previous research has shown that 
individuals with SAD and BDD exhibit difficulty identifying facial expressions and 
interpretive biases for threat in social situations. The current study aimed at further 
investigating social cognition in SAD, BDD, and mentally healthy controls (35 individuals 
per group, respectively). Further 35 individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
as a clinical control group not characterized by evaluation fears were included.  
Methods: The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) was applied. 
It consists of 45 video sequences depicting interactions among four people at a dinner party. 
Participants are instructed to evaluate each scenario with respect to the characters` emotions, 
thoughts, and intentions while being in a bystander perspective (i.e., other-referent context).  
Results: Only the socially anxious groups (SAD and BDD) were overall less accurate 
than the other groups in correctly interpreting the social situations, whereas no difference 
was obtained between the OCD and control groups. Further analyses indicated that the SAD 
and BDD groups were less accurate in identifying other people’s thoughts and intentions, 
whereas, again, no difference was observed between the OCD and control groups. In 
addition, the SAD group was less accurate in inferring thoughts and intentions than the OCD 
group. Interestingly, the groups did not differ with respect to identifying other people’ 
emotions. 
                                               
9 This study has previously been published as: 
 
Buhlmann, U.*, Wacker, R.*, Dziobek, I., (2015). Inferring other people’s states of mind: Comparison 
across social anxiety, body dysmorphic, and obsessive-compulsive disorders. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 34, 107-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2015.06.003 
* shared first authorship 
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Conclusions: These results mostly confirm existing cognitive-behavioral models of 
SAD and BDD emphasizing that biased interpretation of what others think or intend is one 
of the key factors maintaining social anxiety and appearance-related concerns. Our study 
shows that this bias generalizes to social situations in which individuals take a third-person 
observer perspective. 
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common and disabling anxiety disorder 
characterized by strong fears and/or avoidance of social or performance situations in which 
the individual might feel embarrassed or scrutinized by other people (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) is defined by a preoccupation 
with perceived defects or flaws in one’s own physical appearance, often tied to some facial 
aspects (e.g., size or shape of the nose or eyes). If the person has a slight physical defect, the 
concern about it has to be markedly excessive (APA, 2013). Both SAD and BDD are 
characterized by strong fears of negative evaluation by others (related to one’s own 
appearance or feelings of incompetence, e.g., Pinto & Phillips, 2005). Thus, the ability to 
correctly read other people’s minds (intentions, thoughts, and emotions), also referred to as 
theory of mind (ToM), is important in determining threat in social situations.  
According to cognitive-behavioral models of SAD (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997) and BDD (e.g., Feusner, Neziroglu, Wilhelm, Mancusi, & Bohon, 2010; 
Veale, 2008) biased interpretation of ambiguous social or appearance-related information is 
one of the key factors maintaining social anxiety and/or appearance-related concerns. For 
instance, a person with SAD or BDD might interpret somebody laughing as evidence for 
having said something foolish or for looking disgusting, which, in return, leads to significant 
distress and avoidance of such situations. These behaviors, in turn, are believed to play a 
crucial role in the maintenance of SAD (Hofmann, 2007; Clark, 2001) and BDD (e.g., 
Wilhelm, 2006). Someone without SAD or BDD, however, might interpret the same 
situation in a non-threatening way („The person is laughing because I said something funny 
or interesting“) and, thus, not be distressed about or avoid the situation.  
Indeed, there is clear evidence for biased interpretation of ambiguous social 
information in SAD (e.g., Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 2000) and BDD (e.g., Buhlmann et al., 2002; 
Clerkin & Teachman, 2009). Amir and colleagues (1998), for example, used an 
interpretation questionnaire, in which individuals with SAD, individuals with OCD, and 
mentally healthy control participants read a series of ambiguous social scenarios (e.g., 
“someone you are dating says ‘hello’ to you”) Participants were presented with a negative, 
positive, and neutral interpretation and were asked to rank them in terms of how likely they 
would come into their mind (self-referent) or into the mind of another person when being in 
that situation (other-referent). The authors found that the SAD group was more likely to 
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interpret the scenario in a negative way, relative to the other groups. This bias was specific 
to the self-referent context. Further, in a previous study, individuals with BDD, individuals 
with OCD, and mentally healthy controls were presented with ambiguous social scenarios 
and it was found that only the BDD group interpreted the scenarios as threatening (Buhlmann 
et al., 2002).  
A growing body of research shows emotion recognition deficits and biases in SAD 
and BDD. Simonian, Beidel, Turner, Berkes, and Long (2001) found deficits in facial 
expression recognition in socially anxious children. Joormann and Gotlib (2006) showed 
that individuals with SAD were more sensitive to recognizing facial expressions of anger 
than of sadness, and that they needed less emotional intensity to recognize angry faces than 
did depressed and control participants. In another recent study by Hezel and McNally (2014) 
individuals with SAD exhibited impaired emotion recognition ability for negative affective 
expressions. When studying individuals with BDD Buhlmann, McNally, Etcoff, Tuschen-
Caffier, and Wilhelm (2004) found that they performed poorer in recognizing emotional 
expressions, and specifically misinterpreted disgust more often as anger than the OCD, and 
control group. Further, BDD was associated with difficulties in identifying emotions in 
situations that directly focus on the self rather than someone else (Buhlmann, Etcoff, & 
Wilhelm, 2006). Given the strong evaluation fear and the frequent presence of ideas of 
reference (e.g., that others stare at them), individuals with SAD and BDD might be 
particularly sensitive to facial expressions. For example, they might interpret a person’s 
expression as negative when it is actually neutral. Therefore, an impaired ability to recognize 
facial expressions and to decode other people’s thoughts and intentions may be crucial for 
maintaining or causing disorders that are characterized by strong fears of negative 
evaluation. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned studies confirm that SAD and BDD are 
characterized by negative socially-relevant interpretive and emotion recognition difficulties. 
To the author’s knowledge though, these studies used words or static pictures such as faces 
as the experimental stimuli, leaving the question open about the ecological validity of these 
paradigms. Further, previous findings suggest that social cognitive deficits related to SAD 
and BDD are generally less manifest regarding other-referent situations (Amir et al., 1998; 
Buhlmann et al., 2006). However, the majority of these studies examined the ability to infer 
mostly cognitive states (rather than emotions) in SAD, and emotional states (but not thoughts 
or intentions) in BDD, respectively. Overall, the generalizability of these suggestions 
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remains somehow limited. Thus, this study aim was to further examine social cognition 
among individuals with SAD and individuals with BDD in order to test the hypothesis that 
they exhibit deficits in accurately inferring cognitive and emotional states in other-referent 
situations. Individuals with OCD, and mentally healthy participants served as control groups. 
OCD was chosen as a clinical control condition to examine whether the hypothesized deficits 
in social cognition would also be evident in other psychological disorders that are not 
characterized by anxiety and avoidance related to social situations. To test the hypothesis 
the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) was 
administered. This ecologically valid video-based measure might better capture the specific 
social anxiety and BDD-related concerns (rather than previously used words or static 
pictures) since the movie displays dynamic interactions among multiple persons and thus 
approximates the characteristics of everyday social life. At the same time, it represents an 
other-referent situation as participants take a bystander perspective observing a self-
unrelated interaction. Lastly, a crucial feature of the MASC is that it allows to specifically 
assess the affective vs. cognitive mental state category, which was made use of in order to 
differentiate the ability to read other people’s emotions vs. thoughts and intentions. This was 
also aimed at extending the results of Hezel and McNally (2014) who found lower MASC 
scores in their SAD group as compared to a non-SAD group. The authors did not, however, 
quantify to which extent this mindreading deficit was based on the misinterpretation of 
others’ emotional versus cognitive mental states. 
3.3 MATERIALS AND METHODS  
Participants 
The SAD group was comprised of 35 individuals (21 females) whose diagnoses were 
confirmed by a licensed psychologist (U.B.) administering the German version of the 
structured clinical interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV; SCID; Wittchen, Wunderlich, Gruschwitz, & Zaudig, 1997). Social anxiety 
symptom severity was assessed with the German version of the widely used Liebowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987; Stangier & Heidenreich, 1997). It consists of the 
description of 24 social situations that are evaluated with respect to the corresponding 
anxiety and avoidance during the past week. Internal consistency in the current sample was 
α = .95. The LSAS indicated moderate social anxiety symptom severity in the SAD group 
(see Table 3.1). Although SAD was the primary diagnosis in all cases (based on symptom 
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Table 3.l. Means and standard deviations by group for demographic and symptom-specific measures 
Measure BDD group  
 (n = 35) 
SAD group 
 (n = 35)  
OCD group  
 (n = 35)  
Control group  
(n = 35) 




























































Note. SAD = Social anxiety disorder; BDD = Body dysmorphic disorder; OCD = Obsessive-compulsive disorder; YBOCS = Yale-Brown 
Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (possible range: 0 – 48); BDD-YBOCS = BDD Modification of the YBOCS (possible range: 0 – 48); LSAS = Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale (possible range: 0 – 144); BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II (possible range: 0 – 63); Means sharing subscripts do not 
differ (ps > .05, Bonferroni-corrected). 
 
Study 2: Mindreading in Adults with Pathological Fear of Social Evaluation 
57 
severity), SCID interviews revealed the following current comorbid Axis I diagnoses: 
specific phobia (n = 10), major depression (n = 5), dysthymia (n = 4), alcohol abuse (n = 4), 
alcohol dependence (n = 3), panic disorder without agoraphobia (n = 2), panic disorder with 
agoraphobia (n = 1), posttraumatic stress disorder (n = 1), and substance dependence (n = 
1). 
The BDD group was comprised of 35 individuals (21 females) whose diagnoses were 
confirmed by the first author administering the German version of the structured clinical 
interview for DSM-IV (SCID; Wittchen et al., 1997). Current BDD symptom severity was 
assessed using the Body Dysmorphic Disorder Modification of the Yale-Brown Obsessive-
Compulsive Scale (Phillips et al., 1997), which is a clinician-administered interview 
assessing BDD symptom severity within the past week. BDD-YBOCS interviews indicated 
moderate BDD symptom severity in the BDD group (see Table 3.1). Social anxiety was 
assessed using the LSAS, indicating moderate social anxiety within the last week. Further, 
internal consistencies of both the BDD-YBOCS (α = .86) and LSAS (α = .95) were high. As 
in the other clinical groups, although BDD had to be the primary diagnosis in all cases (based 
on symptom severity), SCID interviews revealed the following current comorbid Axis I 
diagnoses: major depression (n = 14), specific phobia (n = 11), alcohol dependence (n = 3), 
dysthymia (n = 3), posttraumatic stress disorder (n = 3), alcohol abuse (n = 2), panic disorder 
with agoraphobia (n = 2), substance dependence (n = 2), binge eating disorder (n = 1), bipolar 
I disorder, currently depressive episode (n = 1), hypochondriasis (n = 1), and panic disorder 
without agoraphobia (n = 1).  
The OCD group was comprised of 35 individuals (17 females) with a primary 
diagnosis of OCD, as determined by the SCID. OCD symptom severity was assessed with 
the German version of the clinician-administered Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale 
(YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989). It consists of 10 items measuring the severity of OCD 
symptoms during the past week. Internal consistency within the OCD was good (α = .87). 
YBOCS interviews indicated moderate OCD symptom severity in the OCD group (see Table 
3.1). Further, although OCD was the primary diagnosis in all cases (based on symptom 
severity), SCID interviews revealed the following current comorbid Axis I diagnoses: major 
depression (n = 7), panic disorder without agoraphobia (n = 2), specific phobia (n = 2), 
alcohol abuse (n = 1), chronic tic disorder (n = 1), dysthymia (n = 1), and hypochondriasis 
(n = 1). 
Study 2: Mindreading in Adults with Pathological Fear of Social Evaluation 
58 
The control group was comprised of 35 participants (21 females) with no current or 
past Axis-I psychiatric history, as determined by the SCID. For all groups, a history of 
psychotic disorders was an exclusion criterion. Further, a current or past diagnosis of 
comorbid SAD (BDD or OCD, respectively) was an exclusion criterion among the clinical 
groups. As evident from Table 3.1, the groups did not significantly differ with respect to age, 
F(3, 136) = 0.22, p = .88, ηp2 = .005, years of education, F(3, 136) = 6.93, p = .56, ηp2 = .015, 
and gender, χ2(3) = 1.40, p = .71. Except for one participant with a mixed ethnical 
background (Caucasian/Asian) participants were Caucasians. All participants were recruited 
through posted flyers in the greater Berlin area, Germany. 
Materials 
Self-Report Questionnaire. Participants completed the German version of the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck & Steer, 1987; Hautzinger, Bailer, Worall, & Keller, 
1995). The BDI-II is a widely used 21 item self-report scale examining depressive symptoms 
during the past two weeks. Internal consistency in the current sample was α = .92.  
 
Figure 3.1. Example of an MASC scene, and corresponding multiple-choice responses (text 
above was not presented to participants). Copyright 2010 by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Adapted 
with permission.  
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC). The MASC (Dziobek et al., 
2006) is a video-based test measuring the ability to accurately infer others´ mental states. 
Participants watch a 15-min movie about four characters (two females, two males) getting 
together at a dinner party. Participants are instructed to answer 45 multiple-choice questions 
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about the characters´ mental states (emotions, thoughts, and intentions) at given breaks 
throughout the movie. Questions mainly refer to complex mental states and allow a detection 
of subtle mindreading difficulties (Dziobek et al., 2006).  
The MASC allows for a right/wrong response format (one correct response out of 
four possible responses) and provides a sum total score for all mental state decoding 
questions. It further allows for the quantification of the mindreading accuracy for the 
following subcategories: 1) thoughts and intentions (example item see Fig. 3.1), and 2) 
emotions (e.g., “What is Sandra feeling?). Participants were presented with positive (e.g., 
gratitude) as well as negative emotions (e.g. irritation) with varying levels of arousal. Facial 
and verbal expressions as well as contextual cues provided the relevant information to 
correctly answer the question. No specific instructions were given with respect to which 
specific cues are supposed to be used when answering the questions. Participants read a 
written instruction: “You will be watching a 15 minute film. Please watch very carefully and 
try to understand what each character is feeling or thinking. (….) When you answer, try to 
imagine what the characters are feeling or thinking at the very moment the film is stopped.” 
The possible scores range from 0 to 45 (total score), 0 to 18 (thoughts and intentions), and 0 
to 15 (emotions). Additionally, non-social inferencing is examined using six control 
questions (e.g., “How was the weather this evening?” The respective correct answer has to 
be inferred from the clothing of the arriving protagonists) in order to consider general 
intellectual functioning as a potential confound of social cognitive performance. 
Procedure 
The study was part of a larger project on cognitive and psychophysiological factors 
of BDD, funded by the German Research Society. It consisted of three separate visits. During 
the first visit, following informed consent, participants underwent the SCID interview 
conducted by the first author to establish the clinical status (or the absence of any current or 
past psychiatric history). The clinical groups additionally underwent the corresponding 
disorder-specific interviews after the completion of the SCID. The second and third visits, 
between two to six days later, were always kept 24 hours apart. During the third visit, the 
MASC was administered, followed by the completion of the BDI-II before being fully 
debriefed and receiving compensation for their participation.  
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3.4 RESULTS 
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics  
Means and standard deviations for the measures of social anxiety, BDD, OCD, and 
depressive symptoms are listed in Table 3.1. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated 
that the groups significantly differed with respect to depressive symptoms, as measured with 
the BDI-II, F(3, 136) = 20.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .307. Follow-up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests 
indicated that the clinical groups had significantly higher scores on the BDI-II, relative to 
the control group, ps < .001, Cohens d effect sizes > 1.44, whereas no differences were 
observed among the clinical groups, ps > .10, ds < .50. BDI score and MASC total score 
were not significantly related (r = -.16, p = .06). Further, the groups significantly differed 
with respect to their social anxiety symptoms, as measured with the LSAS, F(3, 136) = 
36.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. As expected, both the BDD and SAD groups had significantly 
higher scores than the OCD and control groups, ps < .02, ds > 1.08, and the OCD group had 
higher scores than the control group, p = .006, d = .81. Further, the SAD and BDD groups 
did not differ from each other, p = .33, d = .36. 
MASC Performance 
First, to evaluate possible differences with respect to the overall ability to decode 
mental states, an univariate ANOVA with groups as the between-subject factor and the 
MASC total score as the dependent variable was computed. As evident in Table 3.2, the 
groups significantly differed with respect to their overall ability to read other people’s mental 
states, F(3,136) = 8.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Follow up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests indicated 
that both the SAD and BDD groups had significantly lower scores than the control group, ps 
< .04, ds > .72. Further, the SAD group had significantly lower scores than the OCD group, 
p = .001, d = .89, whereas the BDD group scored in-between the SAD and OCD groups. 
That is, they neither differed from the SAD group, p = .45, d = .37, nor the OCD group, p = 
.15, d = .55. In addition, the groups did not differ with respect to non-social inferencing 
(control items), F(3,136) = 1.82, p = .15, ηp2 = .04. Furthermore, the above reported group 
differences in total MASC score were still present when individual differences in non-social 
inferencing were included as another covariate in the ANOVA (F(1,134) = 8.43, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .16). Also, follow up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests resulted in the same pattern of 
significant group differences. Taken together, this indicates that social cognitive deficits 
were likely independent of non-social intellectual functioning. 
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The MASC categories. Data were submitted to an ANOVA with groups as the 
between-subject factor and MASC category (emotion, thoughts and intentions) as the 
repeated measurement. The ANOVA yielded significant main effects for group, F(3,136) = 
8.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, and category, F(1,136) = 153.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, but no 
significant groups by category interaction, F(3,136) = 1.55, p = .21, ηp2 = .03.  
With respect to the category “thoughts and intentions”, exploratory analyses 
indicated that the pattern of results was similar to that found for the total MASC score, 
F(3,136) = 9.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. Specifically, both the SAD and BDD groups had 
significantly lower scores than the control group, ps < .001, ds > 0.82. Further, the SAD 
group had significantly lower scores than the OCD group, p = .001, d = .85, whereas the 
BDD group scored in-between the SAD and OCD groups. That is, they neither differed from 
the SAD group, p = .45, d = .36, nor the OCD group, p = .15, d = .54. Interestingly, with 
respect to the category “emotions”, no significant differences were obtained among the 
groups, F(3,136) = 2.54, p = .06, ηp2 = .05, ps > .08, ds < .53. Only one trend was observed 
indicating that the SAD group, relative to the OCD group, was slightly worse identifying 
other people’s emotions. 
 
Table 3.2. Means and standard deviations by group for the MASC 
 
Measure 
BDD group  
 (n = 35) 
SAD group 
 (n = 35)  
OCD group  
 (n = 35)  
Control group  
(n = 35) 
 M SD M SD     M SD     M SD 
MASC 
(total score) 




















Note. SAD = Social anxiety disorder; BDD = Body dysmorphic disorder; MASC = Movie 
for the Assessment of Social Cognition (total score and subscores); OCD = Obsessive-
compulsive disorder; Means sharing subscripts do not differ (ps > .05, Bonferroni-
corrected).   
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
The present study examined social cognition across SAD, BDD, and OCD by using 
the MASC as an ecologically valid measure, which assesses the ability to interpret others´ 
cognitive (thoughts and intentions) and emotional states within an other-referent context, i.e. 
situations where participants interpret social interactions from a bystander perspective. 
Inferring thoughts and intentions turned out to be significantly impaired in socially anxious 
individuals with SAD and BDD, which seems to underlie their lower overall mindreading 
performance in the context of a complex and dynamic social interaction. Interestingly, 
groups did not differ significantly in inferring other people’s emotional states.  
It was found that the overall mindreading performance was actually worse in both 
SAD and BDD groups. This result partially replicates that of Hezel and McNally (2014) who 
found a poorer MASC total score performance in individuals with SAD relative to a non-
SAD group. More importantly, this finding poses the questions whether the social cognitive 
deficit actually generalizes over self- and other-referent situations, and if this generalized 
bias might be more strongly pronounced regarding inferences about others´ thoughts and 
intentions as compared to inferences about emotional states. The “double standard” 
hypothesis (Buhlmann, Winter, & Kathmann, 2013) poses that socially anxious people such 
as BDD sufferers apply biased interpretation more readily when situations are self-referent 
(Buhlmann et al., 2006), whereas being more neutral when performing other-referent tasks 
such as the “Reading the mind in the eyes” test (measuring emotion recognition from 
photographs of the eye region of strangers). This context factor might moderate emotion 
inferring in socially anxious individuals, i.e., they “turn off” the negativity bias in non-
threatening other-referent conditions. However, this mechanism might not work when they 
infer others´ thoughts and intentions. Merely observing others´ interactions may already 
stimulate inaccurate and thus misleading interpretations. Supposedly, the “double standard”  
disappears in socially anxious individuals when they read other people’s cognitive states. An 
underlying mechanism could comprise that thinking of other’s thoughts and intentions 
inevitably activates habitual interpretations like “If I was part of this interaction, I would 
expect the character to have critical thoughts”, since exaggeratedly self-focused 
apprehensions of social situations are central to social cognitive explanations of SAD (e.g., 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Ultimately, even though a situation has no self-relevance socially 
anxious individuals expecting negative social outcomes and threat by others tend to 
habitually interpret it in a biased way. A similar explanation is proposed by Samson, 
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Lackner, Weiss, and Papousek (2012) who found that increased social anxiety was related 
to less enjoyment of cartoons requiring the understanding of others’ mental states, and to 
higher response latencies in rating the funniest cartoons (as compared to non-mental state 
cartoons, respectively). The authors assume that socially anxious individuals experience 
threat when inferring the (false) beliefs of others which then biases information processing. 
Clearly, the cartoons used in their study represented an other-referent situation and yet 
induced biased social understanding. It should be noted though that another previous study 
in SAD found that biases are specific to self-referent social situations (Amir et al., 1998). 
Their results are based on written descriptions of other- vs. self-referent social scenarios. 
The discrepancy between their and this studies´ findings may be explained by the relatively 
higher ecological validity of the stimulus material used in the present study. Observing a 
vivid social interaction on a screen resembles a real life other-referent social situation much 
more closely than being asked to imagine a “typical person” while reading vignettes. 
Compared to a movie depicting concrete characters, the sole imagination of a non-specified 
proto-other unavoidably remains somewhat blurred and too abstract to capture the social 
significance of an other-referent situation, in which socially anxious individuals may 
regularly find themselves as a bystander. Especially, they likely take this stance in many 
kinds of group situations (e.g., parties, work meetings, family gatherings), where social 
anxiety hinders them from actively participating but rather leads to passive observation of 
others in social interaction. Thus, the results of the present study indicate that socially 
anxious individuals´ difficulties in understanding what other people are thinking or intending 
might generalize beyond self-referent context, i.e., they also misinterpret situations in which 
they are not directly involved. 
Another line of argument explaining why this social cognitive deficit is especially 
apparent regarding the ability to infer others´ cognitive states but less evident for emotional 
states may lie in the different nature of social cognitive processing of others´ intentions and 
thoughts vs. emotions. Understanding thoughts and intentions encompasses a rather 
complex, higher-level mental operation (Frith & Frith, 2003), which can require elaborate 
multiple-order inference processes such as “A thinks that B believes that C thinks because 
D said...” (Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998). Inferring emotions, also referred to as 
empathic accuracy, on the other hand, is strongly intertwined with physical mirroring (e.g., 
facial mimicry) that facilitate immediate sharing of others´ emotional state rather effortlessly 
(Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). Understanding others´ cognitive states in complex social situations 
with multiple agents therefore may be a more demanding mindreading task than 
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understanding what a person feels, especially since emotion inference may be already well 
informed by direct mirroring. Notably, this deficit in reading other people’s cognitive states 
is unrelated to general non-social cognitive functioning since the study groups did not differ 
with respect to years of education or performance on the MASC control items.  This finding 
is consistent with a previous study showing that impaired MASC performance in individuals 
with SAD is unrelated to intellectual ability (Hezel & McNally, 2014). 
Taking account of these differing social cognitive demands for cognitive vs. affective 
state inferencing, and considering etiological models of SAD and BDD (e.g., Clark & Wells, 
1995; Feusner et al., 2010), the results can be explained as a consequence of the very 
cognitive nature of these disorders. Affected individuals who fear negative social evaluation 
may be particularly prone to disorder-specific biases when they perform complex social 
cognitive inferring tasks. For example, the process of reflecting on what a person expresses 
between the lines is probably much more easily accessible to habitual interpretative biases 
(i.e., generally expecting threatening social information) compared to more immediate 
emotion inferring processes operating at a lower cognitive level. 
Though overall group differences in emotion inferring ability failed to reach 
statistical significance it should be briefly discussed that only the SAD group was slightly 
worse than the OCD group in identifying other people’s emotions. It is possible that the 
scenarios used in the MASC were mostly relevant to individuals with SAD and, to some 
extent, less relevant to individuals with BDD, given that they were not specifically 
appearance-related. 
A final explanation for the result that groups did not differ significantly in inferring 
other people’s emotional states might refer to the fact that the MASC - unlike in previous 
studies where emotional stimuli were more static and distinct - provides a rich, audio-visual, 
dynamic, context-embedded informational basis which might enable individuals with SAD 
and BDD to use a broader range of contextual cues flexibly when inferring emotions. 
Possibly they compensate and combine emotional information from multiple sources 
allowing them to make up for a general emotion recognition deficit. Thus, future research 
needs to examine this (e.g., by developing a more self-referent versus other-referent version 
of the MASC). 
Notwithstanding, when comparing the present results with previous findings the 
special quality of emotion recognition biases needs to be considered also. It has been shown 
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that inaccurate emotion inferring in BDD and SAD specifically comprises the 
misidentification of (neutral) faces as angry or contemptuous (e.g., Buhlmann et al., 2004, 
2006) as well as an increased sensitivity for recognizing faces as angry (Joormann & Gotlib, 
2006), respectively. Thus, the nature of emotion recognition inaccuracy in socially anxious 
individuals appears to be disorder-specific, i.e., a pronounced tendency to perceive social 
threat. However, in this study the quality of emotions within this MASC subcategory was 
not differentiated, and therefore the specificity of the social cognitive bias was not addressed. 
Taking this into account, the disorder-specific emotion recognition bias perhaps has not been 
fully provoked in the participants. 
The current study has several limitations. First, the SAD and BDD samples consisted 
of slightly more female participants. Second, given that we recruited for this study using 
mainly posted flyers, we cannot exclude the possibility that our sample is self-selected and 
not entirely representative of these clinical populations. However, it should be mentioned 
that our clinical samples were comparably impaired (as determined with disorder-specific 
measures such as the (BDD)-YBOCS and LSAS) as clinical BDD, SAD, and OCD samples 
included in published treatment trials (e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2014; 
Kocovski et al., 2013). Third, another limitation of the presented findings concerns the fact 
that the group differences were rather small. The MASC is a global measure capturing a 
broad variety of contents (friendship, flirting, group dynamics, general social scripts, etc.). 
Therefore, the content of MASC characters´ mental states are not specifically related to the 
disorder-specific evaluation fear that the biases of socially anxious individuals rely upon. 
Presumably scenarios more closely related to negative evaluation fear might result in larger 
group differences between socially anxious and healthy control participants. Thus, future 
research should construct such scenarios for a film-based measure such as the MASC, which 
should include self-referent situations as well. That is, the movie would comprise scenes 
displaying characters that look directly into the camera and talk to the participant. In 
conclusion, it is strongly proposed to further investigate the differentiation between the self- 
vs. other-referent mode of mindreading in socially anxious individuals in order to better 
understand the role that social cognition plays for the maintenance or even etiology of 
disorders such as SAD and BDD. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the findings provide further support for cognitive-behavioral models 
of social anxiety and BDD that emphasize the importance of negative socially-related beliefs 
for the presentation of symptoms directly tied to social anxiety (e.g., anxiety in or avoidance 
of social situations). One possible implication for cognitive-behavioral therapy of socially 
anxious patients could be to further expand the treatment focus on in vivo behavioral 
experiments involving observer-perspective social situations. For instance, SAD patients 
could be asked to interview non-anxious others about their actual thoughts during a 
performance evaluation (e.g. a talk) which they attend as a bystander. This external 
information (e.g. answers like “During the talk I had the feeling that the audience liked it”) 
could be used by patients to challenge their own interpretations of other people’s thoughts 
in putatively highly threatening social situations (e.g. “Surely he/she expected to bore the 
audience.”). 
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4 STUDY 3: TRAINING MENTAL STATE COMMUNICATION IN 
TYPICALLY DEVELOPING ADULTS IN HEALTH 
PROFESSIONS10 
4.1 ABSTRACT  
One major source of mental health problems in health professionals are personally 
demanding encounters at work. Thus, a crucial prevention focus is the development of 
emotional and social skills necessary to effectively manage interactions with clients, 
colleagues, and supervisors. The aim of our pre-post intervention field study was to evaluate 
an employee training in nonviolent communication (NVC) within a public health 
organization. A training group participated in a 3-day NVC training and completed 
questionnaires before and 3 months after training. Changes in NVC skills, empathic distress, 
empathy, and social stressors at work were compared with data from a control group without 
training. Additionally, we observed NVC-trained participants´ communication behavior 
immediately before and after the intervention. We found a promotion of communication 
skills in training participants as evidenced by increased emotion verbalization behavior and 
enhanced use of NVC at work. Empathic distress declined, and an increase of social stressors 
at work was prevented by enhanced emotion verbalization. The findings demonstrate that 
NVC training can be an effective means to foster emotional and interpersonal skills and to 
prevent empathic distress and social stressors at work in individuals working in 
socioemotionally challenging settings. Possible causal mechanisms explaining the training 
effects are discussed.  
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The prevention of socioemotional stressors in employees represents a key challenge 
for health institutions, since a stressed staff is more likely to be affected by mental health 
problems, absenteeism, and turnover (e.g., Dormann & Zapf, 2004; Michie & Williams, 
2003; Tyssen, Vaglum, Gronvold, & Ekeberg, 2000; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998).  This 
holds true not only for the health sector but for all other fields involving “people work”, as 
they generally demand the skillful and professional handling of emotionally difficult 
encounters and interpersonal conflicts with interaction partners at work. In this paper, we 
present an empirical evaluation of an employee training in nonviolent communication (NVC; 
Rosenberg, 2005), which aimed at enhancing interpersonal skills and preventing empathic 
distress and social stressors at work among health professionals. 
Emotional Labor in Health Professionals: Empathic Distress 
Interactions with clients constitute one major source of work strain (Bolger & 
DeLongis, 1989; Dormann & Zapf, 2004; Grandey, 2000; Keenan & Newton, 1985; Zapf, 
Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini, & Holz, 2001). Especially in healthcare settings, dealing with 
illness and suffering represents a central psychological demand of employees´ daily work, 
since job stressors such as emotional pressure and patient demands (instead of more 
objective factors, e.g., high workload, on call sleeping hours) prove to be major predictors 
of mental health problems (Tyssen et al., 2000). In terms of emotional labor (Hochschild, 
1983), showing compassion and avoiding expressions of negative feelings towards clients 
are essential job role expectations in healthcare (Diefendorff, Erickson, Grandey, & Dahling, 
2011; Larson & Yao, 2005).  
General models of emotional labor (Grandey, 2000; Hülsheger & Schewe, 2011) 
identify two possible emotion regulation strategies in professional interactions with clients. 
Deep acting refers to the internal modification of feelings and a genuine display of expected 
emotions, whereas surface acting is limited to the fake expression of role-consistent 
emotions without internal experience of corresponding feelings. While health professionals 
are expected to show empathy, the suffering of others can evoke an immediate reactive 
emotion that strongly contradicts this professional role. This response is referred to as 
empathic distress, a “self-focused, aversive, affective reaction to the apprehension of 
another’s emotion” (Eisenberg, 2000; p. 672). It is a form of empathic overarousal that 
results from poor emotion regulation and lessened self-other distinction (Decety & Lamm, 
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2009; Eisenberg et al., 1994). Accompanying feelings are discomfort, tension, and anxiety, 
which promote egoistically motivated withdrawal from others in need (Batson, Fultz, & 
Schoenrade, 1987). Although Davis (1983) originally conceptualized it as a subcomponent 
of empathy, more recent empirical work strongly supports the assumption that empathic 
distress represents a distinct construct (Cliffordson, 2002; Hawk et al., 2013; Pulos, Elison, 
& Lennon, 2004) which clearly contrasts with empathic concern and compassion (Klimecki 
& Singer, 2011). Larson’s and Yao’s (2005) emotional labor model of clinical empathy thus 
considers the internal regulation of empathic distress as crucial for health professionals´ deep 
acting, and as a mediating factor of job burnout, one of the ultimate outcomes of clinical 
empathy. Based on the findings of a range of neuroscientific experiments, Klimecki and 
Singer (2011) similarly argue that burnout in caregivers is related to empathic distress 
fatigue. Indeed, in a previous study with Salvation Army officers, empathic distress was 
found to predict emotional exhaustion (Gross, 1994), which is the central aspect of job 
burnout (Maslach, Schaufeli, & Leiter, 2001). 
Managing Relationships with Colleagues and Supervisors: Social Stressors at Work 
While supporting social relationships and a nurturing emotional climate within work 
groups can buffer healthcare professionals´ strain due to emotional labor with patients 
(Grandey, Foo, Groth, & Goodwin, 2012), negative relationships and conflictual interactions 
with colleagues and supervisors can contribute to work-related psychological strain and 
cause depressive symptoms in employees (Dormann & Zapf, 2002). As pointed out by Frese 
and Zapf (1987), social stressors at work do not simply correspond to a lack of social support 
but are conceptualized as aversive social experiences and relationships with coworkers and 
supervisors, such as interpersonal conflicts and animosities, disharmonious interactions, and 
a negative work team climate. Diary studies revealed that employees report to be involved 
in interpersonal conflicts at work on half of the days (Hahn, 2000), and that social conflicts 
directly affect daily mood, accounting for 80% of its variance (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, 
& Schilling, 1989). Similarly, Bruk-Lee and Spector (2006) found that employees who had 
more interpersonal conflicts at work also experienced more negative job-related emotions. 
Social stressors at work seem to interfere with employees´ weekend recovery, as they are 
negatively related to psychological detachment and sleep quality (Pereira & Elfering, 2014). 
In addition, social stressors at work have a long-term negative impact on employees´ mental 
and physical health, as shown by longitudinal investigations (Berset, Semmer, Elfering, 
Jacobshagen, & Meier, 2011; Dormann & Zapf, 2002).   




NVC is an approach aimed at handling socioemotionally demanding situations 
(Rosenberg, 2005; Rosenberg & Molho, 1998). The basic assumption of NVC is that 
individual emotional discomfort and relational conflict resulting from stressful interactions 
can be prevented through a certain style of communication. More precisely, NVC entails i) 
the communication of non-evaluative observations, ii) the expression of feelings and needs, 
iii) clear requests, as well as iv) empathic listening to dialogue partners. According to 
Rosenberg (2005), speakers should start potentially conflictual dialogues with specific 
descriptions of an observed behavior or event, while associated personal evaluations or 
subjective judgments should be left out in order to avoid perceptions of criticism and 
defensive reactions in dialogue partners. A subsequent step in the communication process is 
the expression of one’s own feelings and (unmet) needs related to this observation. Such 
verbalization behavior requires emotional self-awareness (i.e. identification of inner 
affective states) on the one hand, and the knowledge and vocabulary of differentiated 
feelings and underlying needs on the other. Finally, clear requests specifying the concrete 
behavior that is supposed to fulfill those needs should be addressed towards the dialogue 
partner in a non-demanding way. When being in the role of the listener, NVC involves 
empathically receiving the observations, feelings, needs, and requests that are implicitly or 
explicitly communicated by others. Rosenberg (2005) refers to it as “a respectful 
understanding of what others are experiencing” (p. 91), and assumes that practicing this 
listening style fosters empathy between dialogue partners.  
Previous studies in prisoners and parolees evaluated the effects of NVC training on 
empathy, self-compassion and communication skills (Marlow et al., 2012; Suarez, Lee, 
Rowe, Gomez, Murowchick, & Linn, 2014). A case study investigated the value of NVC in 
student online coaching and mentoring (Cox & Dannahy, 2005). Moreover, Nosek (2012) 
reports some anecdotal narratives on the use of NVC by nursing students. All these findings 
support the idea that NVC is effective in promoting interpersonal skills and relationship 
quality. However, given that the available studies are few in number, heterogeneous, and 
methodologically limited, more research is needed to evaluate NVC based interventions.  
Present Study 
We suggest that interpersonal and communication skills represent a promising scope 
for a secondary prevention intervention designed to target health professionals´ regulation 
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of empathic distress in emotional labor with patients, as well as their management of social 
stressors resulting from relationships with colleagues and supervisors. NVC builds the 
rationale of behavioral interventions designed to promote communication skills and empathy 
in various applied contexts (Rosenberg, 2005; Rosenberg & Molho, 1998). However, despite 
the work of nearly 500 certified NVC trainers around the globe, and the wide application of 
NVC trainings in fields like health care, education, and community work (Center for 
Nonviolent Communication, 2016), academic effectiveness studies are scarce. Thus, the 
purpose of our study was to investigate whether NVC training enhances communication 
skills and empathy, and if it has the potential to prevent empathic distress and social stressors 
at work. We expected that the training has a proximate learning effect as well as a transfer 
effect (Kirkpatrick, 1998) on communication skills. Thus, we hypothesized that NVC 
training will increase emotion verbalization immediately after the training (Hypothesis 1a), 
as well as the later use of NVC at the workplace (Hypothesis 1b). As empathic listening is a 
central component of NVC, we also expected that NVC training promotes empathy 
(Hypothesis 2). Given that NVC entails intrapersonal emotion management (i.e., awareness, 
labeling, and expression of own emotions), we further hypothesized that NVC training will 
reduce empathic distress (Hypothesis 3). Ultimately, NVC is conceptualized as an effective 
means of interpersonal relationship management (i.e., non-judgemental, non-demanding, 
and empathic interaction). Therefore, we expected NVC training to reduce social stressors 
at work (Hypothesis 4). 
4.3 METHODS  
We carried out a pre-post intervention study in the field setting of a public health 
organization in Germany. The organization has several branches with more than 600 
employees, including physicians, nurses, and administrative personnel. A sample of 
employees who voluntarily participated in a 3 day NVC training took part in a questionnaire 
survey before and 3 months after the training. Pre-post changes in NVC skills, empathy, 
empathic distress, and social stressors at work were compared with questionnaire data 
collected in a control sample of employees who did not receive any intervention. In addition, 
we examined more proximate training effects by observing participants´ emotion 
verbalization behavior during a group discussion immediately before and after the training. 
Figure 4.1 presents an overview of the study design and number of participants. Both study 
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design and procedure were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Department 
of the Humboldt University Berlin, Germany.  
Figure 4.1. Study design and participants. 
Participants 
The organization’s human resources department offered the opportunity to 
voluntarily participate in the NVC training via e-mail and intranet blackboard to the entire 
staff. At the same time, employees were informed that before and after the training 
participants would be invited to take part in the collection of questionnaire and video data, 
Pre-measures  





N = 43 
Group discussion 
N = 35 
Questionnaires 
N = 61 
Post-measures  
Questionnaires 
N = 27 
Questionnaires 
N = 29 
Group discussion 
N = 30 
(immediately after training) 
(immediately before training) 
 (no intervention) 
(3 months after pre-questionnaires) 
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which would be used by the authors for scientific purposes. Random assignment of 89 
interested participants to a training group (TG) and control group (CG) was not feasible 
because of practical and organizational constraints. Overlap in organizational unit 
membership across TG and CG participants had to be ruled out in order to avoid possible 
confounds through everyday personal interaction among employees during the course of the 
study (e.g., social learning effects). At the same time, individual scheduling preferences had 
to be matched with fixed training dates and limited participant numbers.  
Considering these constraints, 46 of the 89 interested employees were assigned to the 
TG and invited to take part in our study. At the day of the training, two participants failed to 
appear, and one person, despite completing the training, refused to participate in the study. 
An additional 14 TG participants did not reply to the post questionnaire. The other 43 
employees were assigned to the CG. As we expected relatively lower response rates in this 
group, we also invited 95 additional employees to the study via email. They had been invited 
to participate in the training but had not responded to the initial training announcement. 
Again, non-overlap in organizational unit membership with TG participants was considered. 
The pre-questionnaire was completed by 55 CG participants, and 6 other participants for 
whom organizational unit membership could not be established were excluded from the 
study. Another 28 CG participants did not reply to the post-questionnaire. 
The final pre-post analysis sample comprised 29 participants in the TG and 27 in the 
CG.11 Participants’ mean age was 49.2 years (SD = 7.4) in the TG, and 47.3 years (SD = 7.9) 
in the CG (t[48] = .92, p = .36). The high percentage of female participants (TG: 85%; CG: 
89%; χ2[1] = .17, p = .69) represented the organization’s personnel structure (82% female 
employees). Participants´ average organizational tenure amounted to 12.22 years (SD = 9.30) 
in the TG, and 10.10 years (SD = 8.10) in the CG (t[50] = .90, p = .37). Groups were not 
equivalent with respect to educational level. TG participants had more years of education (M 
= 15.9, SD = 4.4) than CG participants (M = 12.3, SD = 3.6; t[48.16] = 3.22, p < .01). 
                                               
11 We conducted an attrition analysis. Of the total of 98 participants who provided pre-questionnaire 
data and were included in the analysis, 56 (57.1%) completed the study and provided post-questionnaire data. 
Chi-square analyses revealed that attrition levels differed marginally significant between study groups (TG: 
32.6%, CG: 50.9%; χ2(1) = 3.32, p = .07). However, there was no significant Group (TG vs. CG) x Attrition 
(dropouts vs. completer) interaction effect on demographic or training outcome variables as a series of 
ANOVAS revealed. 
 




Intervention. The training intervention was designed and carried out by one 
experienced NVC trainer who had been commissioned as an external consultant by the 
organization. The aim of the training intervention was to develop and foster NVC skills in 
the participants, particularly for potentially tense or conflictual interactions with clients and 
colleagues at work. A special focus was placed on expressing and responding to strong 
emotions like frustration and anger (for further details on the concept and methods of the 
NVC training, see Weckert, 2012). The 3 day program (7 hr of training per day) included 
theoretical explanations (one-third) and practical exercises (two-thirds) of the core 
components of NVC (non-evaluative observations, feelings and needs, clear requests, 
empathic listening). Brief introductory presentations, group role plays, dyadic conversations, 
nonverbal communication, and self-exploration techniques were applied. During the 
practical parts, participants were encouraged to use real communication situations that they 
had experienced at work. Instructional handouts supported the exercises. The in-house-
trainings were provided in three groups of 14 to 15 participants in the organization’s own 
facilities in spring 2012. 
Data collection. To assess training effects over 3 months, communication skills, 
empathy, and stress were assessed via self-report measures. In the TG, paper and pencil 
questionnaires were administered on the first day of the training before its start. In the CG, 
the questionnaires were provided online after acceptance of invitation to participate in the 
study. Three months after pre-data collection, we asked participants in both groups via e-
mail to answer the same online-questionnaires again. The second data collection was 
announced to all participants when they received the first questionnaires. 
Additionally, we examined the proximate training effect by observing the 
communication behavior of TG participants in a group discussion on the first day of the 
training before it started, and on the last training day after it ended. Thirty-five participants 
(80%) of the TG were willing to join discussion groups, which were randomly composed of 
four to six persons. Five participants dropped out at post-discussion because of other 
obligations after the training. We chose “work assignment” as discussion topic. Based on a 
detailed written description of a scenario, we asked participants to picture themselves being 
part of a team which receives an extra high workload from their team supervisor while being 
understaffed. The task was to discuss this issue and decide on the individual work 
assignments among the team members while the group was instructed to agree on only two 
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(in groups of up to four persons) or three (in groups of six persons) group members who 
would be responsible for the extra work. Topic and task were chosen because they resemble 
a moderately conflictual but common workplace situation for employees. Discussions lasted 
for on average of 8 min (SD = 2.5) and were terminated if they exceeded 10 min. The 
interactions were video-recorded on the basis of written informed consent and coded as 
described below. 
Group Discussion 
Emotion verbalization. Adding a behavioral observation measure of emotion 
verbalization, the frequency of verbal expressions of emotional states during group 
discussion was assessed by coding the videotaped interactions with the Discussion Coding 
System (DCS; Schermuly & Scholl, 2012). The coding procedure for the purpose of this 
study entails i) the group discussion being segmented into individual statements on the basis 
of a set of rules defining when a new statement is coded (e.g., when speakers change, or 
when they address a new person), and ii) the communicative function of each statement 
being coded with regard to the verbalization of positive or negative emotions. Emotional 
statements are specified as messages by which speakers express their own positive or 
negative feelings explicitly, e.g., “I am satisfied/content/glad/happy” or “I feel 
disappointed/irritated/distressed/under pressure” (Schermuly & Scholl, 2012). Frequency 
was calculated as the sum of the person’s emotional statements divided by the sum of the 
person’s total statements. Coding of communicative function based on the DCS categories 
proved to have a strong interrater agreement throughout various studies (Cohen’s kappa 
ranging from .72 to .91; Schermuly & Scholl, 2012).  
Data analysis. To assess whether NVC training had a proximate effect on emotion 
verbalization, we analyzed pre- to post-training changes in the frequency of verbal 
expressions of emotional states during group discussion in the TG. We conducted separate 
analyses for changes in frequency of expressions of positive and negative emotional states 
by performing Wilcoxon signed rank tests, as the assumption of normal distribution was not 
met. 
Questionnaires 
Nonviolent communication. As, to the best of our knowledge, no published 
comprehensive measure of NVC as conceptualized by Rosenberg (2005) exists, we used a 
self-developed 18-item scale that represents the four core components of NVC, i.e., i) 
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observing without evaluating (e.g., “I describe my perception to my dialogue partner without 
evaluating [positively or negatively].”), ii) expressing feelings and needs (e.g., “I find it easy 
to tell my dialogue partner about my feelings.”), iii) clear requesting (e.g., “When I ask my 
dialogue partner for something, I express myself as clearly as possible in order to avoid 
misunderstandings.”), and iv) empathic listening (e.g., “I can understand my dialogue 
partner’s feelings, even if he expresses them indirectly.”). Reliability of the scale was α = 
.91. Further information regarding scale development can be found in appendix A. 
Cognitive and emotional empathy. Trait empathy was assessed by two subscales 
(four items each) of Paulus´ (2009) “Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen (SPF)”, which 
is a German variant of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). The perspective 
taking subscale measures the understanding of another person’s psychological point of view 
(e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision”), and 
thus, represents cognitive empathy. The empathic concern subscale focuses on feelings of 
warmth and sympathy for unfortunate others (e.g., “I have tender, concerned feelings for 
people less fortunate than me”), and thus, represents affective empathy. Internal consistency 
was α = .80 (perspective taking) and α = .64 (empathic concern). We chose these subscales 
as the most established self-report empathy measures, and because they, despite representing 
a trait-based measure, have been successfully used in similar studies to examine 
intrapersonal change over short time periods (e.g., 8 weeks; Birnie, Speca, & Carlson, 2010). 
Empathic distress. Empathic distress, i.e., self-oriented feelings of discomfort and 
anxiety that emerge when apprehending another's emotion, was measured by the 
corresponding SPF personal distress subscale (four items, α = .76; e.g., “Being in a tense 
emotional situation scares me”, “In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-
ease”). 
Social stressors at work. Intensity of social stressors was assessed using a 10-item 
scale developed by Frese and Zapf (1987). The scale focuses on animosities and conflicts 
with colleagues and supervisors, and a negative social climate at the workplace (e.g., “One’s 
hash is settled even for minor matters”, “My supervisor pushes all the time”, “I have to work 
together with people who do not understand fun”). The internal consistency was α = .88. 
All questionnaire items were answered on five-point rating scales ranging from 0 = 
not at all true to 4 = completely true. 
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Data analysis  
We separately conducted 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANCOVAS with Group (TG vs. 
CG) as between-subject factor and Time (pre vs. post) as within-subject factor. Years of 
education were included as a covariate in each model, since TG and CG were not equivalent 
in terms of educational level. 
4.4 RESULTS 
Proximate Effect of NVC Training on Emotion Verbalization 
Means and standard deviations for emotion verbalization during group discussion are 
presented in Table 4.1. The frequency of negative emotional state expressions significantly 
increased (z = - 3.39, p < .001, r = - 0.62), while the frequency of statements containing 
positive emotional states did not change significantly (z = -.98, p = .33,  r = - 0.18). Thus, 
the training specifically increased the capability to verbally convey negative emotions to 
communication partners during a conflictual group discussion (Hypothesis 1a). 
 
Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations of immediate outcomes in the training group 
Outcome  M (SD) 
pre/post 
Emotion verbalization in % (negative states) 2.80 (9.64)/10.51 (13.16) 
Emotion verbalization in % (positive states) 0.88 (3.23)/1.53 (3.32) 
Note. N = 30. 
 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of means and standard deviations of training 
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Table 4.2. Means and standard deviations of outcomes in the training group and control 
group over 3 months 
Outcome  
M (SD) 
TG (N = 29) CG (N = 27) 
pre/post pre/post 
Nonviolent communication 2.09 (.47)/2.32 (.43) 2.54 (.51)/2.45 (.55) 
Perspective taking  2.50 (.66)/2.60 (.57) 2.69 (.72)/2.71 (.81) 
Empathic concern  2.74 (.61)/2.60 (.58) 2.72 (.55)/2.61 (.64) 
Empathic distress  2.04 (.81)/1.70 (.72) 1.44 (.91)/1.49 (.89) 
Social stressors at work 1.05 (.68)/0.97 (.71) 0.70 (.54)/0.93 (.75) 
Note. TG = training group; CG = control group.  
Effect of NVC Training on NVC Skills over 3 Months  
The ANCOVA of changes in NVC skills yielded a significant interaction effect, 
F(1,48) = 4.66, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, 90% CI [.003, .227]. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc 
comparisons further revealed a significant increase in the TG (Mpre = 2.14, Mpost = 2.33, p < 
.05), while mean scores in the CG did not change significantly (Mpre = 2.51, Mpost = 2.43, p 
= .38), supporting our assumption that NVC training increases NVC skills (Hypothesis 1b). 
Effects of NVC Training on Cognitive and Emotional Empathy over 3 Months 
We conducted two separate analyses in order to examine changes in cognitive and 
emotional empathy. For perspective taking the ANCOVA interaction effect failed to reach 
statistical significance, F(1,49) = 1.76, p = .19, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI [.000, .148]. Furthermore, 
no significant interaction effect resulted for empathic concern, F(1,49) = 0.18, p = .67, ηp2 = 
.004, 95% CI [.000, .073]. Taken together, there was no conclusive evidence for our 
hypothesis that NVC training promotes cognitive and emotional trait empathy as measured 
via self-report questionnaire (Hypothesis 2).  
Effects of NVC Training on Empathic Distress and Social Stressors at Work over 3 Months 
Training effects on empathic distress and social stressors at work were analyzed 
separately. The ANCOVA yielded a significant interaction effect for empathic distress, 
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F(1,49) = 4.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .09, 95% CI [.003, .225]. In Bonferroni-corrected post hoc 
analyses we found a significant decrease in the TG (Mpre = 2.25, Mpost = 1.90, p < .01), but 
no significant change in the CG (Mpre = 1.26, Mpost = 1.32, p = .64). A different pattern 
resulted regarding changes in social stressors: The marginally significant interaction effect 
(F[1,47] = 3.56, p < .10, ηp2 = .07, 95% CI [.000, .205]) was based upon the increase in the 
CG (Mpre = 0.64, Mpost = 0.92, p < .05), and a stable level of social stressors in the TG (Mpre 
= 1.06, Mpost = 1.02, p = .71) as Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons revealed. In 
summary, these results support the assumption that NVC training reduces empathic distress 
(Hypothesis 3). NVC training, however, did not decrease social stressors at work as expected 
(Hypothesis 4), but prevented its increase instead.  
Training Intention Analysis within the CG 
We analyzed possible training intention effects within the CG. Nine participants 
(33%) reported that they had responded to the initial training announcement, while 17 
participants (63%) indicated that they had not. One participant did not answer that question. 
These two CG subgroups did not differ in age (t[22] = -.70, p = .49), educational level 
(t[11.92] = -1.74, p = .11), tenure (t[24] = .80, p = .43), and gender ratio (χ2[1] = .19, p = 
.67). However, given that varying levels of the intention to participate in the training may 
differently affect changes over time, we conducted a series of 2 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVAS with CG Subgroup (CGresponder vs. CGnon-responder) as between-subject factor and 
Time (pre vs. post) as within-subject factor. No Group x Time interaction effect resulted for 
any training outcome variable, indicating that patterns of changes among CG participants 
were actually independent of their initial intention to take part in the NVC training. 
Mechanism of Preventing Social Stressors at Work Through Proximate NVC Training Effect 
on Emotion Verbalization 
To explore whether the proximate training outcome, as measured through discussion 
analyses, was associated with training outcomes over 3 months, we first created variables 
quantifying change for all outcome variables (Mpost - Mpre). We then separately regressed 
variables representing change over 3 months on change in verbalization of negative emotions 
in the TG only. As 9 of 30 group discussion participants had not fully completed the post 
questionnaire, the following results are based on N = 21. Analyses identified increase in 
emotion verbalization during group discussion as a significant negative predictor (B = -.48, 
p < .05) of increase in social stressors at work, with 23% variance explained, R2= .23, F(1,19) 
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= 5.64, p <.05. Thus, prevention of an increase in social stressors at work through NVC 
training seems to in part rely on the enhanced capability to express negative emotions to 
interaction partners. There were no further significant relationships with changes in the other 
outcome variables. 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
The aim of our study was to examine the effectiveness of a training in NVC 
(Rosenberg, 2005) in employees of a public health organization. NVC includes the 
communication of non-evaluative observations, expressions of feelings and needs, clear 
requests among dialogue partners, and empathic listening. We found that the 3-day 
intervention promotes communication skills as evidenced by an increase in verbalization of 
negative emotions during a conflictual group discussion, as well as enhanced NVC skills in 
everyday communication at work 3 months after the training. Furthermore, participants 
showed a decline in empathic distress, while the increase of social stressors at work was 
prevented by an enhanced capability to verbalize negative emotions during a group 
discussion. There was no conclusive evidence to assume that NVC training is beneficial in 
promoting cognitive and emotional trait empathy within 3 months. Overall, we conclude that 
NVC training is an effective means to foster emotional and interpersonal skills and to prevent 
empathic distress and social stressors at work in health professionals. This study 
demonstrates the effectiveness of a short employee training preventing psychological 
stressors that have been shown to cause mental health problems in health professionals. 
Despite the wide use of NVC based interventions in various applied fields, empirical 
evaluations in the workplace have been lacking so far. To our knowledge this is the first 
controlled NVC effectiveness study to address this research gap. 
When discussing a conflictual work situation in the group, participants verbalized 
their negative emotions (for example, frustration or stress), more frequently after the NVC 
training. The verbalization of positive emotions did not increase, which is plausible because 
this above scenario is not likely to elicit positive affect. In addition, this proximate training 
effect was followed by an improvement in NVC skills employed in communication 
situations at work 3 months after the training. Taken together, the results support the 
assumption that NVC is a sustainably trainable communication skill (Rosenberg, 2005; 
Rosenberg & Molho, 1998). While NVC is practiced by nearly 500 trainers in various 
applied contexts (Center for Nonviolent Communication, 2016), to date there has been little 
scientific evidence examining the effectiveness of this intervention approach. Our study 
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contributes to the scarce academic publications addressing NVC and fills this gap with a 
controlled and quantitatively based evaluation. Drawing on Kirkpatrick’s (1998) four-level 
training evaluation model we consider the change in observed emotion verbalization to 
constitute a proximate effect on the learning level ("principles, facts, and techniques 
understood and absorbed", p. 4), whereas increase of self-reported communication skills in 
work settings is interpreted as a transfer effect on the behavior level ("applying learned 
principles and techniques on the job", p. 5). The improvement of communication skills in 
our participants corresponds to a certain extent to the enhancement of NVC skills in male 
prisoners after NVC training (Suarez et al., 2012), and to the qualitative evidence of another 
study (Marlow et al., 2012), where residents of a substance abuse treatment facility for men 
on parole reported to have enhanced listening skills after NVC training. Since our 
participants represent a non-deviant sample, which was predominantly composed of women, 
our findings further contribute to the generalizability of NVC training effectiveness.  
Besides improved communication skills we also found a decrease of empathic 
distress in training participants. This result supports the assumption that NVC is an effective 
way to manage one’s own feelings occurring in emotionally tense interactions (Rosenberg, 
2005). Referring to the account of empathic distress as an aversive empathic overarousal, 
which results from low emotion regulation capabilities accompanied by a failure to 
disentangle the self from the other (Decety & Lamm, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 1994), we 
propose that NVC training reduces empathic distress by promoting these crucial regulation 
and distancing processes. Observing others´ negative affective states in a non-judgemental 
manner and being aware of one’s own feelings and needs enables health professionals to 
establish a psychological distance to interaction partners in emotionally charged situations, 
e.g., when talking to suffering clients or upset colleagues. This inner distance contributes to 
the prevention of other-induced negative affect like discomfort and anxiety. Evidence 
supporting the positive effects of non-judgementality and, especially, self-awareness has 
been provided by mindfulness literature (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, 
Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Hülsheger, Alberts, Feinholdt, & Lang, 2012).12 Birnie and 
colleagues (2010) found a reduction of empathic distress through a mindfulness based stress 
reduction program, concluding that mindfulness prevents observers from becoming 
                                               
12 Given that aware, non-evaluative, and accepting attention to present experiences is the defining 
characteristic of mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003), it possesses strong conceptual overlap with NVC. 
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emotionally overwhelmed by others´ suffering. Further insight into the underlying brain 
mechanisms comes from a neuroimaging study (Creswell et al., 2007), in which mindfulness 
was shown to be positively associated with enhanced prefrontal cortical regulation of 
negative affect during emotion labeling. The authors suggested that mindful labeling of 
negative emotions triggers a process of inner detachment from these affects. Similarly, we 
assume that awareness and expression of emotions through NVC may activate similar 
distress regulating mechanisms. Even if, in especially delicate situations at work, it seems 
inadequate to frankly express one’s own negative feelings towards others, merely becoming 
consciously self-aware of them without judging oneself or others might help to down-
regulate strong emotional states. An additional explanation of how NVC training reduces 
empathic distress refers to the primarily cognitive nature of empathic listening, as it includes 
active and attentive decoding, processing, and inferring of information about the other’s 
inner states (Bodie, 2011; Drollinger, Comer, & Warrington, 2006; Janusik, 2007). 
Approaching conversations in a rather analytical mode of listening may further contribute to 
the regulation of negative affect in highly tense situations. At the same time, distress-
promoting overlap of the self and the other becomes less likely as the other’s inner state 
becomes rather objectified. 
A further stress-related NVC training benefit was the prevention of an increase in 
social stressors at work. Taking into account that the effect was predicted by the proximate 
change in verbalization of negative emotional states towards others, this seems to be one 
causal mechanism in the prevention of interpersonal problems with colleagues and 
supervisors. How may the expression of one’s own negative feelings possibly relate to the 
dynamics of dysfunctional social interactions? First, we argue that emotion verbalization has 
an important self-regulation function. As outlined above, emotional self-awareness in terms 
of affect labeling has shown to be associated with enhanced emotion regulation (Creswell et 
al., 2007). This may help soothe emotionally charged situations at an early stage. 
Considering that in NVC verbalized emotions are clearly self-referring (e.g., “I feel 
disappointed.”) instead of other-referring, judgmental, or accusing (e.g., “You disappoint 
me.”), expressing one’s own affects can function as an adequate and non-provocative 
“cooling-off” strategy right at the beginning of potentially conflictual interactions with 
colleagues or supervisors. Second, we assume that emotion verbalization possesses a social 
integration function. Going beyond initial self-regulation, expressing one’s own affective 
state through verbal and non-verbal displays elicits others´ affective empathy (de Vignemont 
& Singer, 2006; Dziobek et al., 2008). As it is positively related to prosocial behavior (e.g., 
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empathy-altruism-hypothesis; Batson et. al, 1987) empathy-inducing emotion verbalization 
may thus strengthen cooperative tendencies in others, and may thereby prevent conflict 
escalation or facilitate conciliation. Finally, emotion verbalization may also function as 
important behavioral feedback for others because it provides rich information on the 
interpersonal consequences of their statements or actions. This assumption is in line with 
Van Kleef’s (2009) Emotions as Social Information Model, according to which emotional 
expressions trigger inferential processes in others, which subsequently influence their 
behavior. For example, verbalizing disappointment may lead interaction partners to realize 
that their behavior did not meet certain expectations. As a consequence they may seek further 
information that would help them clarify others´ expectations and eventually alter their 
behavior in order to rebuild a satisfactory interpersonal exchange and harmonious 
relationship. Clearly, this feedback function of emotion verbalization depends on the fact 
that – except for temporary animosities and conflicts – interaction partners have a 
cooperative orientation towards each other. That being said, it is possible that proximate 
changes in other NVC components, which we did not examine, may also have played a 
comparable role in preventing social stressors at work. For example, we speculate that 
disputes among colleagues may be hampered by the expression of clear requests to fulfill 
specific needs. 
As perspective taking and empathic concern did not significantly increase, the 
assumed promotion of empathy through NVC training (Rosenberg, 2005; Rosenberg & 
Molho, 1998) was not supported. Possibly, the intervention promotes the awareness of one’s 
own inner states, which does not directly lead to enhanced cognitive and affective empathy 
for others but merely builds its basis. As studies in alexithymia (i.e., impairment in 
identification and description of feelings) show, emotional self-awareness is a central 
precondition of empathy (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010; 
Moriguchi et al., 2007). Learning to sense and express what oneself is observing, feeling, 
needing, and requesting through NVC thus can be regarded as the preceding condition before 
empathic reception of the same states in others can be cultivated. Therefore, we assume that 
during the first 3 months after training, participants place a relatively stronger emphasis on 
developing emotional self-awareness in communication situations, while working on their 
empathic listening skills take the back seat, and may have a delayed effect on their capability 
to empathize with others. Still, despite this possible explanation of our findings, they actually 
differ from the results of the study by Marlow et al. (2012), where the authors found 
heightened levels of self-reported emotional empathy in their participants after a NVC 
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training. However, their study design lacked a control group leaving open whether other 
factors, e.g., pretest sensitization, drove the results. Moreover, in addition to NVC, a 
substance abuse treatment was applied to the same group of individuals, and it is possible 
that this treatment led to the observed increase in empathy. Thus, the causal role of that 
study’s NVC intervention on fostering empathy remains unclear. Yet, when interpreting our 
own results we must consider the specific nature of the empathy measure we used. The SPF 
(IRI) assesses trait empathy, which is a general disposition that conceptually differs from 
situation-specific state empathy. It is possible that a potential effect of NVC training on 
empathy does not generalize over a multitude of situations but is limited to specific contexts, 
e.g., when interacting with clients and colleagues but not when talking to others in settings 
outside the workplace. With regard to future investigations of NVC training effectiveness, 
we propose to apply performance based empathy tests. For example, the photo based 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008), as well as the Movie for the Assessment 
of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) allow to assess participants´ objective 
performance scores of empathic functioning. We consider these measures to be more 
sensitive to intraindividual changes in affective and cognitive empathy, and thus particularly 
appropriate for the scope of pre-post intervention studies.  
A limitation of our study is that the proximate training effect on emotion 
verbalization as assessed via discussion analysis was not controlled in terms of a comparison 
group. Unfortunately, due to organizational reasons, it was not possible to invite the CG 
participants to take part in separate group discussions. Therefore, we cannot rule out that the 
emotion verbalization increase resulted from general group climate changes after 3 days of 
joint training. On the other hand, our analysis showed that changes in emotion verbalization 
systematically predicted changes in social stressors at work. Since a short-termed unspecific 
effect on the emotional climate within the training group would be unlikely to predict the 
reported prevention of social stressors increase at the workplace 3 months later, this 
relationship somehow validates the uncontrolled, yet reasonable, proximate training effect. 
Nevertheless, future studies should replicate this finding by including an active control 
group, which, ideally, receives a non-specific communication training that shares the formal 
and didactical features of the NVC training. In doing so, other researchers may also be 
interested in investigating proximate changes in the other components of NVC, which we 
did not examine. This would further clarify the relative role of non-judgmental observations, 
clear requests, and empathic listening in the prevention of interpersonal conflict at work, 
thereby shedding more light on the core causal mechanisms of NVC in enhancing 
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interpersonal functioning and preventing stressors in socioemotionally challenging fields 
like healthcare. 
Finally, the NVC training as a secondary prevention intervention could be useful in 
combination with a primary intervention targeting psychological strain resulting from 
emotionally and socially challenging interactions in health professionals´ work. As has been 
shown by Bond, Flaxman, and Bunce (2008), individuals with higher psychological 
flexibility (i.e., capacity for mindful, focused, goal-directed action) benefit more strongly 
from a primary control-enhancing redesign intervention in terms of reduction of non-specific 
psychological distress. Similarly, we propose that the promotion of NVC skills could 
enhance the strain-reducing effects of a primary intervention aimed at, for example, 
changing health professionals´ emotional display rules or advancing emotion regulation and 
acting strategies in interactions with clients. 
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As a first step in developing the Nonviolent Communication Scale, we generated a 
list of items which represent the core components of the construct, i.e., i) observing without 
evaluating, ii) expressing feelings and needs, iii) clear requesting, and iv) empathic listening. 
Next, we presented the item list to the professional NVC trainer who conducted the training 
intervention in this study. Unclear or controversial items were discussed and rephrased. The 
22-item list was then administered to the initial sample of participants in the TG and CG 
with the instruction to “think of normal communication situations with dialog partners in the 
context of your work”. Data of a total of N = 104 were collected. We performed exploratory 
factor analysis (principal components analysis, varimax rotation), and found the theoretically 
supposed 4-factor structure based upon the Kaiser-Guttman criterion and the Scree test. 
Three items were removed due to double-loadings and one item due to low loading (<.40). 
The remaining 18 items were re-analyzed, and 4 factors generated with a total of 72.14% 
explained variance. Internal consistency of the final Nonviolent Communication Scale was 
α = .91. An overview of descriptive and reliability statistics for the original German items is 
presented in Table 4.3 (which is not included in the appendix of the published paper). 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive and reliability statistics of the Nonviolent Communication Scale 




















5.1 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL-COGNITIVE ABILITIES IN INTERPERSONAL 
FUNCTIONING 
Among numerous social-cognitive abilities employed by individuals in order to make 
sense of others and themselves in social life (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), mindreading and 
mindspeaking are particularly intriguing as they enable individual minds to meet, i.e., to 
represent each other´s mental states through observing and talking with each other. In the 
theoretical background of this dissertation, I introduced mental state communication 
(mindspeaking) as an emerging concept reflecting communicative manifestations of 
metacognition and mindreading in verbal communication (see section 1.1). Furthermore, I 
positioned specific aspects of interpersonal functioning in adults with pathological fear of 
social evaluation and typically developing adults in health professions within the general 
interpersonal circumplex (see section 1.2) of affiliation and dominance as the two 
fundamental dimensions of social interaction (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013). The insights 
gained throughout the empirical studies of this dissertation emphasize that being able to 
understand other people’s minds and (verbally) reflect upon mental states is by far not only 
a particular issue for adults with clinically relevant social information processing biases, but 
also a substantial concern for typically developing adults - considering, firstly, the 
interindividual variation in social-cognitive performance and, secondly, the fact it plays a 
pivotal role in interpersonal functioning in particular professions such as healthcare. 
Study 1 advanced knowledge regarding age and gender associated individual 
differences in mindreading ability in typically developing adults based on an objective and 
sensitive assessment paradigm. The observed perceiver-target interaction effect was 
characterized by the superior performance of women, especially for female targets, whereas 
no such own-gender bias was present in male participants. Moreover, in our large sample 
covering an age range from 17 to 70 years, a nonlinear age effect on mindreading with a 
negative trajectory setting on by approximately 30 years shows how this ability differs across 
the adult life span. An intervention aimed at improving social-cognitive abilities in typically 
developing adults, specifically health professionals, was evaluated in study 3. This NVC 
training, targeting mental state communication with interaction partners at work, had a 
positive effect on interpersonal functioning, as it reduced empathic distress, and prevented 
social stressors and conflict with colleagues and supervisors via increased verbalization of 
negative affective states in naturalistic social situations. In study 2, an impaired ability to 
understand others´ thoughts and intentions from a third-person observer perspective was 
General Discussion 
101 
found to be present in adults with SAD and BDD, which are both characterized by low 
interpersonal functioning in terms of social evaluation fear as a shared transdiagnostic 
feature. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that inferring and/or explicitly talking 
about mental states is relevant for different aspects of low interpersonal functioning, such as 
social fear, avoidance, distress and conflict, and, furthermore, that mental state 
communication can be effectively promoted in typically developing adults in professional 
roles demanding good interpersonal functioning. 
This dissertation set out to broaden the theoretical perspective on social-cognitive 
abilities by focusing both on first-person perspective metacognition and second-person 
perspective mindreading within the concept of mental state communication, which is 
proposed as an ecologically valid concept given that interaction partners actually talk about 
their own and listen to each other’s inner states in naturalistic everyday conversations (e.g., 
frequent social sharing of emotions; Rimé et al., 1992). Because listening to conversation 
partners´ mental states involves mindreading, we expected that NVC training would promote 
the general social-cognitive ability to take the psychological perspective of others. This 
prediction, however, was not fully supported by our results as the increase in perspective 
taking in the training group was not statistically significant. Neither did empathic concern 
change as a result of NVC training. Beyond the discussion of these findings as presented in 
section 4.5 (possibly delayed effect beyond post-measurement 3 months after the training; 
self-report questionnaire perhaps insensitive to more subtle changes in objective ability), 
they are further discussed in the following paragraph by considering another intervention 
study’s results which were published after our NVC study. 
Within a larger mental training program for typically developing adults over the 
course of 3 months (ReSource project; Singer et al., 2016), the social-cognitive training 
module included a weekly exercise that is conceptually very similar to the NVC approach. 
In this “Perspective Dyad” task, participants talked about and listened to each other’s 
emotions, thoughts and desires which they were instructed to narrate from the perspective of 
a prototypical “inner part” (e.g., judge, mother, explorer). This task is designed as a 
contemplative dialogue between a speaker taking a meta-perspective on the self, and an 
active, investigative listener engaging in perspective taking to find out which inner part of 
the dialogue partner is actually speaking. This intense training had a significant positive 
effect on mindreading as measured with an objective performance task (Trautwein, Kanske, 
Böckler-Raettig, & Singer, 2017). In addition, the weekly social-cognitive training had a 
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positive effect on experienced feelings of care, warmth, and benevolence towards others. In 
our study, however, empathic concern did not increase. A possible explanation could be that 
3 consecutive days of mental state communication training, despite reducing empathic 
distress, do not necessarily promote prosocial, affiliative motivation at the same time. 
Maintaining self-other boundaries and regulating empathic distress are necessary but not 
entirely sufficient preconditions for developing empathic concern for others (Klimecki & 
Singer, 2012). Therefore, the attenuation of distressing self-other overlap might not 
immediately lead to higher empathic concern. Apparently, the latter relies more strongly on 
a regular interpersonal exercise over the course of several months, as demonstrated in the 
ReSource study. The comparably lower intervention duration in our study could be another 
factor explaining why perspective taking did not increase significantly, although we assume 
that a more sensitive measure would have been needed to test subtle changes as discussed 
above. Given the field setting of our NVC study, it was, unfortunately, not possible for us to 
assess pre-post changes in mindreading using a more time-consuming performance task such 
as the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) in the participating public health organization. However, 
taken together, the positive effect of the dyadic conversational exercise on mindreading in 
the ReSource study further supports the above presented conceptualization of mental state 
communication as a communicative manifestation of second-person perspective 
mindreading, i.e., social cognition in dynamic verbal interaction. Moreover, it confirms the 
prediction that training mindspeaking promotes the general ability to accurately understand 
other people’s mental states.  
Based on this dissertation´s insights and conclusions regarding the respective links 
between mindreading, mindspeaking and interpersonal functioning, further ideas for 
psychological interventions and future research are proposed in the following section. In 
particular, I will discuss suggestions regarding social-cognitive bias modification in socially 
anxious individuals, conflict communication in heterosexual romantic couples, and empathic 




5.2 INTERVENTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.2.1 PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR SOCIALLY ANXIOUS PATIENTS  
Practicing to explicitly communicate about one’s own and others´ mental states in 
naturalistic social interaction could potentially change how psychiatric patients with 
systematic social-cognitive biases represent others, themselves, and their relationships, 
especially if these dysfunctional biases operate rather implicitly in (mis)guiding social 
experience and behavior. 
In the case of social anxiety resulting from a tendency to interpret other people’s 
mental states as negative social evaluations, existing approaches have shown to correct 
negative biases by increasing the occurrence of more positive interpretations of others´ 
intentions and evaluations. For instance, a computerized program presenting written 
ambiguous social vignettes and reinforcing participants to choose benign over threatening 
interpretations (e.g., “Your boss wants to meet with you” - “praise” or “criticize”; “An old 
friend comments on how you look different now” - ”attractive” or “ugly”) effectively 
modified interpretation bias in socially anxious individuals (Beard & Amir, 2008). Such 
standardized procedures for interpretational and attentional cognitive bias modification 
(CBM) are successful in the treatment of various anxiety disorders (MacLeod & Mathews, 
2012), but “enabling CBM to be delivered outside the laboratory also could enhance transfer 
of training in ways that increase the impact of CBM in real-world settings” (p. 207). Indeed, 
lab-field generalizability and ecological validity of training stimuli and procedures is crucial, 
specifically for interventions targeting social cognition in patients with interpersonal 
difficulties such as social evaluation fear and avoidance behavior. Although the real social 
world is less standardized and controlled as compared to a computerized learning 
environment, it actually offers rich opportunities for semi-structured, more naturalistic social 
interaction as a source of social-cognitive bias modification. 
Established cognitive-behavioral intervention approaches for SAD (e.g., Foa, 1994; 
for overview see Hofmann, 2007) focus on exposure to feared social situations, either in 
sensu or in vivo in the (group) therapy room, or in situ in everyday social settings. These 
exercises are usually combined with formal pre- and post-exposure cognitive restructuring 
methods to change dysfunctional general beliefs (e.g., “I am a social failure”) or situation-
specific thoughts (e.g., “Others find my behavior xy ridiculous”) through standardized 
conversation techniques. For instance, therapists have a Socratic dialogue with patients and, 
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moreover, instruct them on how to engage in a rhetorical monologue by proposing self-
disputing questions (e.g., “Is it true that no one likes me?”) and pre-generated rational 
responses (e.g., “I can recall several people who like me”) which they are supposed to apply 
when mentally conversing with themselves (Foa, Huppert, Herbert, Forman, & Yuen, 2009). 
For homework assignments, a paper form is given to patients to exercise this inner 
monologue in the context of self-guided exposure outside the therapy setting. 
These cognitive restructuring techniques, however, operate “offline” without taking 
full advantage of the presumably corrective mechanisms of naturalistic conversation with 
real-life interaction partners. In addition to the sophisticated therapist-patient dialogue and 
self-affirmative inner monologue, it may also be highly informative for patients to learn 
about others´ views directly from others by explicitly asking them in given social situations. 
I propose that therapists would further benefit patients by instructing them on how to use in 
situ conversation techniques for “online” cognitive restructuring through communicative 
exploration of others´ actual (non-)evaluations with suitable dialogue partners in their social 
environment. In order to correct their biased inferences about how others view them, patients 
could be prepared and encouraged to ask neutral interaction partners to explicitly convey 
what they think about their social performance or appearance and its consequences. For 
instance, brief semi-structured questions can be used to interview participants or observers 
in a given social situation about their perceptions of the patients´ behavior. Of course, this 
more advanced self-guided exposure is less well suited for patients with extremely high 
and/or acute symptoms, and more feasible for sufficiently motivated patients maintaining a 
certain level of functioning.  
For example, a work colleague could be asked about her perception of a presentation 
using questions that openly explore the other’s mind without a strong focus on social 
evaluation, e.g., 
- “What was going through your mind during the presentation?” 
- “What did you notice about the presentation? What did you mostly attend 
to?” 
Alternatively, patients could ask more targeted questions to challenge their 
exaggerated expectations of negative social evaluations, e.g.,  




- “How incompetent vs. skilled/stupid vs. smart/inadequate vs. appropriate/ 
anxious vs. confident did I appear to you during my presentation?” (specify 
according to patients´ individual expectations)  
- “Would you be willing to attend another presentation of mine/work with me 
again?” 
Additionally, patients could ask interaction partners a range of further questions 
potentially endorsing unexpected positive social evaluations, e.g., “What did you like about 
my presentation/appearance/behavior?” Alternative scenarios in personal life could be, for 
instance, dinners with friends and new acquaintances. Patients could address similar 
questions to more intimate friends directly after the group interaction. 
An advanced version of this cognitive restructuring interview may include self-
disclosure as well. Patients could be encouraged to explicitly convey their own (biased) 
thoughts and evaluation concerns towards interaction partners (e.g., “I fear that you found 
my presentation horrible”) in order to create direct opportunities for communication partners 
to correct patients´ unjustified mental state inferences. A less challenging version of the 
interview could also be conducted via e-mail or chats with real-life interaction partners, 
given that socially anxious individuals feel safer using internet-mediated communication 
(Lee & Stapinski, 2012). A further variant of the interview could be applied in bystander-
situations without direct self-exposure but with an opportunity to modify other-referent 
social-cognitive biases (e.g., “She knows that the audience found her presentation horrible”). 
As shown in study 2 of this dissertation, mindreading difficulties in socially anxious 
individuals generalize to situations in which they are not involved but merely observe other 
people’s behavior. Thus, similar interview questions could also be targeted at challenging 
patients´ other-referent inferences in such settings (see conclusion of study 2 in section 3.6). 
Finally, the mental state questions could be used in group therapy settings, in which the 
corrective feedback of multiple communication partners during guided group discussion 
could potentially amplify the effectiveness of social-cognitive bias modification through 
mindspeaking. 
Taken together, future intervention research could examine different variants of 
“online” cognitive restructuring to test the hypothesis that explicit communication about 
others´ mental states and one’s own (biased) mental state inferences in naturalistic social 
interaction could possibly help socially anxious individuals to modify the social-cognitive 
biases that play a role in the maintenance of their condition. 
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While the mentioned standard therapy manuals consider possibly available 
intervention confederates as feedback providers (e.g., obtaining ratings from a trained 
confederate after role play), real-life interaction partners could be taken more thoroughly 
into account in the context of self-exposure homework. In terms of the ecological validity of 
corrective social information, people within the natural social environment, e.g., work 
colleagues, neighbors or acquaintances, represent useful “training stimuli”. Ultimately, in 
the mind of patients these individuals are the original source of anticipated judgement, 
criticism, rejection and embarrassment. Thus, it is worth exploring whether they can learn 
through systematic practice of naturalistic mental state communication that evaluations of 
people outside the therapy room are much less negative than expected or even positive.  
5.2.2 COUNSELING FOR ROMANTIC COUPLES 
Research on communication in heterosexual romantic couples consistently finds that 
relationship functioning is particularly well predicted by how effectively partners 
communicate with each other during conflict, and that female and male partners show 
gender-specific behavioral patterns (Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977; Gottman, 
Swanson, & Murray, 1999).  
“Negative mindreading”, defined as statements conveying mental state attributions 
with negative affect (e.g., “You don’t care about how I feel”) without directly asking about 
others´ feelings and thoughts, is categorized as a communicative indicator of criticism in the 
Specific Affect Coding System for couples (Coan & Gottman, 2007). Observational studies 
of naturalistic couple interaction show that negative mindreading statements are indicative 
of distressed couples, while mindreading statements with neutral affect represent functional 
behavior because partners use them as sensitive probes in exploring each other’s mental 
states (Gottman et al., 1977). Interestingly, not wives´ but only husbands´ neutral 
mindreading statements predicted increased marital satisfaction for both partners over the 
course of three years in a longitudinal study (Gottman & Krokoff, 1989). This means that 
men who actively engage in neutral exploration of their partner’s feelings and thoughts 
through explicit mental state communication are more likely to have mutually satisfying 
romantic relationships. This gender effect might be associated with the slightly lower ability 
of men (as compared to women) to accurately infer women’s mental states, as reported in 
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study 1.13 Exploring mental states through communication could represent a reasonable 
compensatory strategy to clarify mental state (mis)attributions, particularly in cross-gender 
interaction. Future research could examine the hypothesis that in functional (heterosexual) 
romantic relationships (male) partners apply mindspeaking strategically when their partner’s 
mental states are unclear to them and accurate mindreading is perceived as challenging (see 
Fig. 5.1 for anecdotal evidence). 
 
Figure 5.1. A male cartoonist’s depiction of mindspeaking in cross-gender interaction shows 
a man communicating a complex mental state inference to a woman. Copyright 1998 by The 
New Yorker Collection/Bruce Eric Kaplan from cartoon-bank.com. Used with Permission. 
Moreover, the study by Gottman and Krokoff (1989) also revealed that women’s 
relationship satisfaction was positively predicted by their expression of anger and contempt 
during conflictual discussions with their male partners. This corresponds with the finding in 
the predominantly female sample of our training study (see section 4), that verbalizing 
negative emotions actually prevented later social stressors and conflict (with interaction 
partners at work though). Therefore, mindspeaking trainings such as Rosenberg’s (2005) 
NVC approach could probably be successfully integrated into couple counseling, 
particularly for those clients facing acute relationship conflict and dysfunctional 
communication patterns. In these cases, both males and females might benefit from 
practicing to empathically listen to their partners´ feelings, needs and thoughts, and to 
assertively express their own (negative) feelings without criticizing the other. 
                                               
13 Though we do not have data regarding the degree of representativeness of our findings for 
heterosexual relationship partners as we did not assess sexual orientation and relationship status in our sample. 
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5.2.3 MENTAL HEALTH PREVENTION FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 
Occupational choices of people entering jobs that include any kind of help, care or 
support in a professional relationship are usually prosocially motivated (Ben-Shem & Avi-
Itzhak, 1991; Duffy & Raque-Bogdan, 2010). Unfortunately, these groups are themselves at 
risk to be affected by particular mental health problems (Williams, 1989) rooted in the 
occupational role demand of being supportive, altruistic, and emotionally responsive 
towards their patients and clients, i.e., emotional labor (Larson & Yao, 2005; Zapf, Seifert, 
Schmutte, Mertini, & Holz, 2001). Previous research has demonstrated that unregulated 
emotional reactivity to unfortunate others in need, i.e., empathic distress, can undermine a 
directed prosocial response, and eventually cause burnout in caretakers (i.e., empathic 
distress fatigue; Klimecki & Singer, 2012). This is one mechanism explaining the paradox 
of socio-emotional exhaustion and withdrawal in initially compassionate individuals in 
helping professions. A social-cognitive mechanism that has been found to lie at the heart of 
empathic distress is poor self-other differentiation (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). Based on this 
research, we discussed the effect of NVC training on reducing empathic distress in health 
professionals (study 3 of this dissertation) in terms of improved self-other differentiation 
through mindful self-awareness in social interaction and a rather analytical stance when 
empathically listening to others´ thoughts, feelings and needs. The practical significance of 
this mechanism is exemplified by a clinician working with traumatized patients: “(...), you 
have to recognize that after a client leaves and if you don’t get rid of the stress then it just 
kind of builds up pretty soon. Then you’re getting all the stuff confused and mixed up—
What’s my stuff and what’s your stuff`” (Killian, 2008, p. 36). 
The basic take home message for occupational mental health prevention is that 
training the ability to communicate about “stuff”, i.e., verbally describing and differentiating 
distressing mental states of others´ vs. the self, could have similar effects in employees in 
other helping professions given the effectiveness of NVC training as demonstrated in our 
study. Empathic distress fatigue has been found in various jobs ranging from physicians 
(Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2014), nurses (Yoder, 2010), psychotherapists (Figley, 2002) to 
social workers (Adams, Boscarino, Joseph, & Figley, 2006), lawyers (Levin & Greisberg, 
2003) and police officers (Andersen & Papazoglou, 2015). NVC represents a general 
practical approach of mental state communication and is thus well suited to be applied in 
diverse interpersonal contexts at work. Human resource managers seeking to increase their 
employees´ wellbeing and effectivity could consider NVC training as an evidence-based 
method to prevent empathic distress fatigue in their staff. 
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5.3 FINAL REMARK: CALL FOR ACTION  
This dissertation investigated people who suffer from a mental health disorder and 
people who work with suffering people and are thus at risk of occupational mental health 
problems. Both might experience their vulnerability in very different ways given their 
respective roles as patient or healer. However, both might be facing the same social stigma 
of mental health issues which represents an obstacle to seeking care among the general 
population (Corrigan, 2004), and especially among clinicians (Miles, 1998). Policy makers 
and health institution managers are called to take action in at least two ways.  
First, the health care system has to make sure that mental health services become 
more visible and more readily available. In Germany, recent policy changes aimed at 
improving immediate availability of psychotherapy but seem to have had no effect as people 
seeking treatment still have to wait twenty weeks on average 
(Bundespsychotherapeutenkammer, 2018). Regarding occupational health management in 
health organizations, human resource managers should systematically implement preventive 
programs with low-threshold accessibility for their physicians, nurses, therapists and all 
other employees engaging in patient care. Second, public marketing campaigns should 
increase social acceptance for seeking psychological help in the general population. Health 
professionals should be specifically encouraged to take preventive care of themselves, for a 
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BDI-II   Beck Depression Inventory-II 
CG Control group 
DSM-IV  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 4th 
edition 
LSAS    Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
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NVC   Nonviolent Communication 
OCD   Obsessive-compulsive disorder 
SAD   Social anxiety disorder  
SCID    Structured clinical interview for DSM 
SPF   Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen 
TG   Training group 
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